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Introduction
On August 2, 2007, two small Russian submarines descended almost
two miles below the surface of the Arctic Ocean and triumphantly planted
a titanium Russian flag on the sea floor.' Most people would have considered it an odd, inconsequential move, if they noticed it at all. In the midst
of wars, economic collapse, and countless celebrity meltdowns, a country's
decision to stick a metal flag at the bottom of an ocean that most people
will never see, let alone explore at its deepest depths, hardly seems important. But to many countries, including the United States and Canada, it
was a major power play: an attempt by Russia to declare to the world that a
huge swath of the Arctic seabed-and the resources found there, including
potentially vast oil and mineral deposits-belonged to it. 2 Unfortunately
for Russia, the world did not agree. 3 Unlike land grabs in the fifteenth or
sixteenth centuries, claiming rights to the ocean floor is not as easy as
getting there first. Under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the
Sea (UNCLOS)-the international agreement carving up jurisdiction over
the ocean and the seabed-while some portion of the Arctic floor might
belong to Russia, figuring out exactly what portion that is will be a lot
4
more complicated than planting a flag.
In declaring its sovereignty over the Arctic, Russia attempted to stake
out rights in the continental shelf. The term "continental shelf' refers to
what scientists call the continental margin-the portion of the sea floor
that extends out from the continents and then drops down to connect with
the deep seabed.5 It consists of the shelf, which is directly adjacent to the
coast and slopes down gently until about 130 meters; the slope, which
1. CJ. Chivers, Eyeing Future Wealth, Russians Plant the Flag on the Arctic Seabed,
Below the Polar Cap, N.Y. TIMES, August 3, 2007, at A8.
2. See id. (describing interest of Canada, Denmark, Norway, Russia, and United
States in claims to Arctic seabed).
3. See id. (quoting Canadian foreign minister, Peter MacKay, as saying, "You can't
go around the world and just plant flags and say, 'We're claiming this territory."'); Christian Wienberg, Denmark Class Russia's Flag Planting at North Pole a 'Joke', BLOOMBERG.
COM, Aug. 15, 2007, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601082&sid=anLc
S7RZgqk4&refer--canada (quoting Danish Minister of Science and Technology, Helge
Sander, as saying "I see the Russian summer stunt as a summer joke.").
4. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S.
397, available at http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention-agreements/texts/unclos/
unclos-e.pdf [hereinafter UNCLOS] (entered into force Nov. 16, 1994).
5. R.R. CHURCHILL & A.V. LowE, THE LAw OF THE SEA 141 (3d ed. 1999).
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comes next and is steeper, dropping down sharply to about 1,200 to 3,500
meters; and the rise, where the margin gradually merges with the deep seabed. 6 Together, these areas cover about one-fifth of the ocean floor.7 The
continental shelf is rich in natural resources. It has extensive oil and gas
reserves-it is estimated that up to 70% of the world's undiscovered
reserves lie offshore 8 -and huge deposits of heavy minerals such as tin,
titanium, chromium, and zirconium. The shelf also has significant concentrations of other minerals, such as diamonds, lead, zinc, gold, silver, and
copper, 9 and is packed with sedentary species such as oysters, clams, lobsters, and crabs. 10
Given its riches, states have long been interested in who holds the
rights to explore and exploit the resources of the continental shelf.1 With
UNCLOS, which sets out a comprehensive legal framework for the world's
oceans, member states finally reached agreement on how to parcel out possession.1 2 Article 76 of UNCLOS states that all coastal states have jurisdic3
tion and control over up to 200 nautical miles of the continental shelf.'
Recognizing that the continental shelf is actually just the underwater
extension of these nations' above-water land territory-over which they
have complete sovereign rights-this provision gives coastal states authority to decide who exploits shelf resources and how they go about doing
14
so.
UNCLOS deems areas outside of coastal-state control part .of the
deep seabed; all states have equal and non-exclusive rights to this area, and
access is controlled by an intergovernmental agency known as the Interna15
tional Seabed Authority (ISA).
For many coastal states, 200 nautical miles of the seabed more than
encompasses their entire continental margin. 16 For others, including Rus7
sia, it falls short-the margin physically extends past the 200-mile point.'
Article 76 permits these states to extend their jurisdiction to up to 350
nautical miles of the ocean floor. 18 To do so, however, they must establish
the limits of their claim through a complex formula laid out in article 76.19
This formula requires extensive scientific testing and measurements to
delineate a set of precise boundaries that mark the edges of the claiming
state's exclusive seabed rights. 20 Before states can declare these boundaries final, they must have the boundaries verified by an expert body set up
6.
7.
8.
9.

10.
11.
12.
13.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 141-42.
Id. at 142.
Id.
See UNCLOS, supra note 4.
Id. at art. 76(1).

14. CHURCHILL &

LOWE,

supra note 5, at 147-48.

15. See UNCLOS, supra note 4, Part XI.
16. CHURCHILL & LOWE, supra note 5, at 148.

17.
18.
19.
20.

Id.
UNCLOS, supra note 4, art. 76(6).
See id. arts. 76(4)-(7).
See id.
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under article 76-the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf
(the CLCS or the Commission). 21 The CLCS is composed of independent
technical and scientific experts responsible for reviewing each extended
shelf claim and ensuring that it adheres to the article 76 formula. 22 The
Commission can agree with the limits the country has proposed or reject
them, in which case the country must rework its evidence and resubmit its
claim. 23 Only when the CLCS has given its stamp-of-approval can the
country set final and binding boundaries. 2 4
In 2001, Russia became the first coastal state to submit a claim to the
CLCS, in which it asserted extensive rights to portions of the Arctic Circle. 25 Considering that it involved the application of an obscure legal provision by an even more obscure international body, the Russian claim
garnered a lot of international attention. 26 Countries like the United
States, Canada, and Norway, who also have potential Arctic claims, were
incensed by what they saw as Russian overreaching. 27 The rest of the
world waited to see how the CLCS process-and thus the delineation of
rights to seabed resources-would play out. In 2002, the CLCS issued its
recommendations and rejected large portions of Russia's claim, including
its Arctic limits. 28 Set back but undefeated, Russia returned to the drawing

board, while its Arctic rivals cheered. Russia is expected to submit a new
claim to the CLCS soon. 29 In the meantime, Russia is planting flags to
remind the world that it still believes it has extensive Arctic rights and that
30
it intends to claim them.
As the Arctic drama unfolds, the CLCS moves forward forward. Countries or groups of countries have subsequently made fifty-one submissions. 3 1 The Commission has issued recommendations on eight claims,
21. Id. art. 76(8).
22. Id. Annex I, arts. 2-3. The CLCS consists of twenty-one experts, nominated by
individual states but elected by all parties, who serve renewable five-year terms. Id.
Annex I, art. 2(1), (4). Nominating states are responsible for covering the costs of their
Commissioner's participation in the CLCS. Id. Annex 11, art. 2(5).
23. Id. Annex 11, art. 8.
24. Id. art. 76(8).
25. David Malakoff, Nations Look for an Edge in Claiming Continental Shelves, 298
SCIENCE

1877, 1878 (2002).

26. See id. at 1878 (describing reaction of United States and other countries to Russian submission).
27. See U.N. Div. for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea, Comm'n on the Limits of
the Continental Shelf, Outer Limits of the Continental Shelf Beyond 200 Nautical Miles
from the Baseline: Submissions to the Comm'n: Submission by the Russian Federation, http:/
/www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs-new/submissions files/submission-rus.htm (last visited
December 21, 2009) [hereinafter Russian Submission] (providing information regarding
Russia's submission and response comments from five nations).
28. See Malakoff, supra note 25, at 1878.
29. See Drawing Lines in Melting Ice, THE ECONOMIST, Aug. 18, 2003 (stating Russia's
deadline to make a claim is 2009).
30. See Chivers, supra note 1.
31. See U.N. Div. for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea, Submissions, through the
Sec'y-Gen. of the United Nations, to the Comm'n on the Limits of the Continental Shelf,
Pursuant to Art. 76, Para. 8 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10
Dec. 1982, http://www.un.org/Depts/los/ccs-new/commission submissions.htm [here-
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including fully approving Australia and New Zealand's submissions in the
spring of 2008, and giving the countries jurisdiction over an additional 2.5
and 1.7 million square kilometers of seabed, respectively. 32 While for
most countries the official deadline to submit claims was May 14, 2009,
the Commission is likely to receive several more submissions over the next
34
several years. 33 As the early contenders have shown, the stakes are high.
The race to carve up the seabed officially has begun.
The Russian experience and the CLCS's ever-increasing workload
show that article 76, while obscure, is not a meaningless bit of international law that UNCLOS member states created only to ignore. Because
article 76 determines who owns huge portions of the ocean's riches, many
countries are interested and invested in the results of the article's delineation process and in the international body that oversees it. Until now,
however, the CLCS has carried out most of its work in secret-reviewing
claims and drafting recommendations in closed meetings, and restricting
access to complete submissions and recommendations to Commissioners
and the submitting state. 35 This Article asks whether such secrecy is
appropriate.
Over the past decade, as formal and informal international institutions have multiplied, scholars and government officials have become
increasingly concerned that the world is building an international institutional infrastructure that is unaccountable to the states and individuals it
supposedly serves. 36 The field of global administrative law has arisen in
response to these concerns: it asks if it is possible to use administrative
procedure mechanisms to increase the accountability of international
actors. 3 7 This Article applies this question to the CLCS, exploring whether
the CLCS's secrecy is just one sign that it is making important decisions
for which no one can demand that it answer. In responding yes, the Article
presents several reasons why the CLCS should be held accountable to the
inafter CLCS Submissions] (last visited December 21, 2009) (listing all claims submitted
to the CLCS as of October 30, 2009).
32. Press Release, Hon. Martin Ferguson, Austl. Minister for Res. and Energy, UN
Confirms Australia's Rights Over Extra 2.5 Million Square Kilometres of Seabed, Apr. 21,
2008, available at http://minister.ret.gov.au/TheHonMartinFergusonMP/Pages/UN
CONFIRMSAUSTRALIA%E2%80%99SRIGHTSOVEREXTRA.aspx; Press Release, Rt.
Hon. Helen Clark, UN Recognizes NZ's Extended Seabed Rights, Sept. 22, 2008, available
at http://www.beehive.govt.nz/release/un+recognises+nz+extended+seabed+rights.
33. See Nathanial Gronewold, Seabed Claims Mount, Swamping U.N. Commission,
N.Y. TIMES, May 14, 2009, available at http://www.nytimes.com/gwire/2009/05/14/14
greenwire-seabed-claims-mount-swamping-un-commission- 10572.html?pagewanted= 1.
34. See Malakoff, supra note 25, at 1877.
35. See Ron Macnab, The Case for Transparency in the Delimitation of the Outer Continental Shelf in Accordance with UNCLOS Article 76, 35 OcEAN DEV. & INT'L L. 1, 12-13
(2004) (describing transparency problems that arise from CLCS confidentiality rules);
Malakoff, supra note 25, at 1878 (quoting officials discussing secrecy of CLCS process).
36. See Ruth W. Grant & Robert 0. Keohane, Accountability and Abuses of Power in
World Politics, 99 AM. POL. Sci. REv. 29, 29-30 (2005) (describing growing concerns over
accountability and democracy in international regimes).
37. See Benedict Kingsbury et al., The Emergence of Global Administrative Law, 68
LAW

&

CONTEMP. PROBS.

15, 31-42 (2004-2005) (describing accountability mecha-

nisms used in domestic systems and discussing their extension to international sphere).
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UNCLOS parties that created it and explores accountability gaps in
existing CLCS procedures; the Article then proposes a number of reforms
that may be able to fill those gaps. The Article aims to increase the responsiveness of the CLCS without undermining the article 76 process, so that
the world does not have to resort to planting flags to determine who owns
the ocean floor.
The Article is divided into four sections. To flesh out the rights and
interests at stake, Part I provides a brief historical overview of the continental shelf regime and article 76. Part II introduces the CLCS, analyzing its
mandate and describing its review procedures. Part III introduces the concept of accountability, develops several reasons that the CLCS should be
accountable to UNCLOS parties, and identifies accountability gaps in its
current functioning. Finally, Part IV identifies a number of mechanisms
that could be used to increase the Commission's accountability.
I.

The Continental Shelf Regime

A.

Background of the Continental Shelf Regime

The idea that a state can have rights to the ocean floor-and the extensive resources buried within it-has been around for over a century. 38 In
the beginning, coastal states had jurisdiction over the seabed and subsoil
within their territorial seas, which extended between three and twelve nautical miles from the shoreline. 3 9 In the areas beyond-the high seas-any
state could establish property rights through effective occupation. 40 In the
mid-1940s, however, this understanding of jurisdiction over the shelf
began to change. On September 28, 1945, U.S. President Harry Truman
made a Presidential Proclamation in which he declared that the United
States would have complete jurisdiction and control over all natural
resources located within the seabed and subsoil of the country's entire continental shelf. 4 1 Truman justified this claim as a matter of right: the continental shelf contiguous to the United States was the natural extension of
the U.S. landmass. 42 Under international law, states have inherent sovereign rights to their land territory. 4 3 Thus, President Truman reasoned, the
United States, as a coastal country, had sovereignty over the underwater
prolongation of its territory and control over access to the shelf and the
38. See CHURCHILL & LowE, supra note 5, at 142 (providing historical overview of
development of law on state possession of continental shelf).
39. See id.
40. See id. at 142-43.
41. United States: Proclamationby the President with Respect to the Natural Resources
of the Subsoil and Sea Bed of the Continental Shelf, 40 AM. J. INT'L L. (SUPPLEMENT: OFFICIAL
DOCUMENTS) 45, 45-48 (1946) [hereinafter Truman Proclamation] ("I, Harry S. Truman,
President of the United States of America, do hereby proclaim . . . [that] the natural
resources of the subsoil and sea bed of the continental shelf beneath the high seas but
contiguous to the coasts of the United States as appertaining to the United States, subject to its jurisdiction and control.").
42. Id. at 45.
43. See North Sea Continental Shelf (F.R.G. v. Den; F.R.G. v. Neth.), 1969 L.CJ. 3, 22
(Feb. 20) (noting states exercise sovereign authority over their territory).

2009

Deciding Who Owns the Ocean Floor

shelrs resources. 44
The Truman Proclamation faced little international resistance, and
other coastal states soon followed the United States' example, declaring
rights to the resources found in their own shelves. 4 5 By the late 1950s,
states' "sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring.., and exploiting" the
46
continental shelf were firmly established in customary international law.
The International Court of Justice declared that coastal-state sovereignty
47
over the shelf was, like sovereignty over land, "an inherent right."
As coastal states consolidated their continental shelf rights, another
issue of seabed jurisdiction began to emerge: if coastal states owned the
shelf, who had rights to the deep seabed that lay beyond it? In the early
days of seabed mining, jurisdiction in the high seas had not been a burning
issue because the sea floor lay so far below the ocean's surface that mining
was technologically infeasible. 48 As science and technology progressed,
however, it became apparent that the valuable minerals buried in the deep
seabed would be accessible one day, and states looked to international law
to establish ownership of those minerals. 4 9 In 1970, after a movement led
by developing countries concerned that rich nations would colonize the
sea floor, the UN General Assembly (UNGA) declared that the seabed
beyond the shelf was the "common heritage of mankind" and not subject to
appropriation by any individual or state. 50 All states, coastal and land44. Truman Proclamation,supra note 41, at 46.
45. See CHURCHILL & LOWE, supra note 5, at 144 (describing claims after U.S.
proclamation).
46. Convention on the Continental Shelf art. 2, Apr. 29, 1958, 499 U.N.T.S. 311. In
1958, states attempted to codify the law of the sea at the Geneva Conference on the Law
of the Sea. See CHURCHILL & LOWE, supra note 5, at 15 (describing work of the first
United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea). The Conference resulted in four
Conventions, including the Continental Shelf Convention. Id. The Convention codified
the Truman Proclamation approach to the continental shelf-that coastal states had sovereignty to explore and exploit the shelf's resources-a position the International Court
ofJustice found to be part of customary international law. See id. at 7. The Convention
garnered enough ratifications to come into force in 1964. See International Law Commission, Law of the Sea: Regime of the TerritorialSea, http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/summaries/8_2.htm (last visited December 21, 2009) (detailing history of codification of law of
the sea, including Convention on the Continental Shelf).
47. See North Sea Continental Shelf, supra note 43, at 22 ("IT]he rights of the coastal
State in respect of the area of continental shelf that constitutes a natural prolongation of
its land territory into and under the sea exist ...by virtue of its sovereignty over the land
....In short there, is here an inhere[n]t right."); see also, Convention on the Continental Shelf, supra note 46, art. 2(3) ("The rights of the coastal State over the continental
shelf do not depend on occupation, effective or notional, or on any express
proclamation.").
48. See CHURCHILL & LOWE, supra note 5, at 223-24 (discussing beginnings of seabed mining industry).
49. See id. at 224-28 (providing background on legal discussions over rights to deep
seabed resources); Johan Ludvik Lovald, In Search of an Ocean Regime: The Negotiations
in the General Assembly's Seabed Committee 1968-1970, 29 INT'L ORG. 681, 681-82
(1975) (describing how new technologies have led to discovery of resources in the deep
seabed).
50. See CHURCHILL & LOWE, supra note 5, at 225-27 (discussing differences between
positions of developing and industrialized nations on seabed regulation); Seabed, 20
INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 583, 583-85 (1971) (announcing that UN General Assembly had
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locked, now had equal rights to the deep seabed and its resources; they
would create an international regime to govern its exploration and
5l
exploitation and ensure that all would share any profits derived from it.
But while states accepted the Common Heritage of Mankind (CHM) in
principle, none understood exactly where the continental shelf and
coastal-state rights ended and where the deep seabed and the CHM
began. 5 2 In declaring jurisdiction, coastal states were not actually mapping the points at which their continental margins merged into the deep
seabed; they simply were making broad declarations of control over the
continental shelf, wherever and whatever that might be.5 3 In other words,
the term "continental shelf' was a legal concept based on the idea of territorial sovereignty, rather than a scientific concept based on geological reality.5 4 To develop an access-and-benefit sharing regime for the deep seabed,
however, reality would have to come into play-states would need to decide
exactly what parts of the ocean floor belonged to coastal states and what
55
parts belonged to everyone.
In 1973, 137 states met to address the continental shelf versus deep
seabed question and a host of other ocean issues at the first round of the
Third Conference on the Law of the Sea, which eventually produced
UNCLOS. 56 Already, states understood that UNCLOS would codify cusadopted "Declaration of Principles Governing the Seabed and the Ocean Floor, and the
Subsoil thereof, beyond the limits of National Jurisdiction," setting forth the "common
heritage of mankind" principle).
51. See Lovald, supra note 49, at 682-83 (describing work at United Nations to
define seabed as "common heritage of mankind"); Seabed, supra note 50, 583-85
(describing passage of UN Resolutions establishing "common heritage of mankind"
principle and introducing idea of international seabed regime).
52. See 2 UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA 1982: A COMMENTARY

829 (Satya N. Nadan et al. eds., 1993) [hereinafter UNCLOS COMMENTARY] (describing
how imprecision of early claims made it impossible to define boundary between
national jurisdiction and deep seabed).
53. See CHURCHILL & LOWE, supra note 5, at 146 (describing early practice of claiming extended shelf rights without defining outer limits); UNCLOS COMMENTARY, supra
note 52, at 493-95 (describing indefinite nature of early claims).
54. See UNCLOS COMMENTARY, supra note 52, at 829 (explaining how early claims
over continental shelf were based on water depth and exploitability, not geologic or geomorphologic characteristics of shelf itself); see generally David A. Colson, The Delimitation of the Outer Continental Shelf Between Neighboring States, 97 AM. J. INT'L L. 91
(2003) (describing how continental shelf as used in UNCLOS is legal concept not scientific one).
55. See UNCLOS COMMENTARY, supra note 52, at 829 (explaining that acceptance of
CHM principle necessitates definition of limits of national jurisdiction over shelf); Nuno
Marques Antunes & Fernando Maia Pimentel, Reflecting on the Legal-Technical Interface
of Article 76 of the LOSC: Tentative Thoughts on PracticalImplementation, 20 (presented at
the ABLOS Conference Addressing Difficult Issues in UNCLOS, 2003), available at
http://www.gmat.unsw.edu.au/ablos/ABLOS03Folder/PAPER3-1.PDF (explaining that
purpose of creating article 76 was to balance common heritage of mankind against
coastal state shelf rights).

56. See

EDWARD

L.

MILES, GLOBAL OCEAN POLITICS: THE DECISION PROCESS AT THE

THIRD UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON THE LAW OF THE SEA:

1973-1982, 3-7 (1998)

(introducing UNCLOS negotiations and describing major issues under discussion,
including deep seabed and continental shelf).
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tomary territorial and universal rights to the seabed.5 7 However, states still
had to define exactly how far jurisdiction stretched and determine how to
establish jurisdictional boundaries. Most states agreed that control should
extend at least up to 200 nautical miles from the territorial sea baselines,
58
which would match the breadth of the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ).
For many coastal states, 200 nautical miles was more than acceptable. 59
Others, however, had continental shelves that physically stretched beyond
200 miles. 60 These "wide-margin" states argued that an arbitrary numerical limit could not extinguish their rights and pushed for a delineation
61
process that would grant them more extensive jurisdiction.
The issues raised by wide-margin states were not merely academic
questions because all UNCLOS parties had significant political and economic interest in who controlled what on the sea floor.6 2 Jurisdiction
would give coastal states the right to control access to the shelf's
resources, 63 and wide-margin states wanted rights to as much of the sea
floor as possible. 64 On the other hand, the CHM principle would govern
57. See Seabed, supra note 50, at 583-84 (describing provisions in UN resolutions on
deep seabed calling for conference to create international seabed regime and codify
other law of the sea issues). The agreement endured. See UNCLOS, supra note 4, art. 77
(giving coastal states sovereign rights over shelf delineated under article 76), art.
136-37 (recognizing that rights to the deep seabed are invested in "mankind as a
whole").
58. See MILES, supra note 56, at 128-29 (explaining that most states agreed on at
least a 200 mile limit). In keeping with the understanding of the shelf as a legal, rather
than scientific, concept, this definition did not depend on how far a state's continental
shelf actually physically extended-coastal states would have rights to all the seabed
resources that fell within 200 nautical miles, even if, according to geology, some of that
area was actually part of the deep seabed. See Antunes & Pimentel, supra note 55, at 5
(describing how claims under article 76 may or may not match physical reality of continental margin).
59. See CHURCHILL & LOwE, supra note 5, at 148 (explaining that many nations,
particularly those with narrow shelves, had an interest in maximizing area of CHM
seabed).
60. See id. (explaining that states with wide shelves had interest in maximizing area
of seabed within scope of national jurisdiction).
61. See MILES, supra note 56, at 129 (describing disagreement between wide-margin
states and other delegations); UNCLOS COMMENTARY, supra note 52, at 831 (explaining
that states understood that negotiations would need to "balance the interests of States
with narrow continental shelves or with no continental shelf, and those of states with
broad shelves .... ").
62. See UNCLOS COMMENTARY, supra note 52, at 831-33 (describing efforts of various factions of states to enhance their control over seabed resources); Robert Smith, The
Continental Shelf Commission, in OCEANS POLICY: NEw INSTITUTIONS, CHALLENGES AND
OPPORTUNITIES 135, 135 (Myron H. Nordquist &John Norton Moore eds., 1999) [hereinafter OCEANS POLICY] (explaining that all states have interest in article 76 regime).
63. See UNCLOS, supra note 4, art 77. This means that if, for example, an oil company from State A wanted to drill for oil in the shelf of State B, it would only be able to
do with State B's permission and subject to State B's regulations; neither State A nor its
oil company would have any say over whether and how it could access State B's oil. See
id. If State B wanted to close off its shelf to all other countries and exploit all the
resources itself, neither State A nor anyone else could stop it from doing so. See id.
64. See CHURCHILL & LowE, supra note 5, at 148 (describing reluctance of widemargin states to give up control over resources beyond 200 nautical miles).
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any area falling within the deep seabed. 65 Under a regime established at
the UNCLOS negotiations, any state could mine the deep seabed, provided
66
it shared some of its profits with the rest of the international community.
An international organization- the International Seabed Authority (ISA)would be responsible for regulating mining and then collecting and distributing shared revenues; UNCLOS parties would develop the ISA's mining
regulations through multilateral negotiations. 6 7 For states with mining
industries, an international agency applying internationally agreed-upon
standards was preferable to coastal states unilaterally imposing regulations
or denying access. 68 For states without mining industries, the deep seabed
regime's profit-sharing provisions were deeply appealing. 6 9 Therefore,
most of these states wanted to maximize the international seabed regime's
reach.
Knowing the strength of the interests at stake, UNCLOS negotiators
understood that jurisdictional boundaries needed to match the actual
physical expanse of wide-margin states' continental shelves, without ceding
to them huge chunks of the deep seabed. 70 The final compromisereached after nine rounds of debate-created an exceptionally complex
formula for recognizing "extended claims" to the continental shelf beyond
200 miles. 7 1 That formula is enshrined in article 76 of UNCLOS.
B.

Article 76 and the UNCLOS Continental Shelf Regime

Article 76 begins by establishing a basic definition of the continental
shelf that recognizes the interests of wide-margin states: a coastal state's
continental shelf consists of either 200 nautical miles of the seabed measured from its territorial sea baselines, or, if the shelf stretches beyond this
point, of the entire natural prolongation of its landmass up to one of two
seaward limits. 7 2 The article adheres to the legal understanding of "continental shelf," which encompasses the entire continental margin, including
65. See Seabed, supra note 50, at 583 (describing incorporation of CHM principle in
UN resolutions).
66. See UNCLOS, supra note 4, art. 82.
67. See id. Part XI; CHURCHILL & LowE, supra note 5, at 239-48 (describing composition and function of International Seabed Authority).
68. See MILES, supra note 56, at 382 (explaining how countries with large oil and gas
industries advocated for narrow shelf limits in order to maximize mining areas under
deep seabed regime).
69. See UNCLOS COMMENTARY, supra note 52, at 844-46 (discussing interests of
developing countries in constrained national jurisdiction over seabed); CHURCHILL &
LOwE, supra note 5, at 226-29 (describing movement by developing countries to create
strong International Seabed Authority to control deep seabed exploitation).
70. See, UNCLOS COMMENTARY, supra note 52, at 831 (describing need for
compromise).
71. See id. at 868-72 (describing ninth and final round of negotiations); Robert W.
Smith & George Taft, Legal Aspects of the ContinentalShelf, in CONTINENTAL SHELF LIMITS:
THE SCIENTIFIC AND LEGAL INTERFACE 17, 17 (Peter J. Cook & Chris M. Carleton eds.,
2000) [hereinafter CONINENT A SHELF LIMITS] (calling article 76 formula "complex, but
workable").
72. UNCLOS, supra note 4, art. 76(1). See infra notes 75-80 and accompanying text
for further details.
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the shelf, slope, and rise. 73 If a state is claiming only 200 nautical miles,
article 76 has no more to say-the entire seabed within those 200 miles
falls under the state's control, even if it is not, from a geological standpoint,
74
part of the continental margin.
For wide-margin states making extended claims, however, the article
lays out a complicated formula for determining the actual outer boundaries
of the continental margin. According to article 76, a state's extended continental shelf hits its outer limit either at any point where the thickness of
the sedimentary rock is less than one percent of the distance between that
point and the foot of the continental slope or at any point sixty nautical
miles from the foot. 75 The foot of the continental slope is the point of
maximum change in the gradient of the slope's base. 7 6 To mark these
outer limits, states use either of the two formulas to measure a collection of
outer points at intervals of sixty nautical miles or less, and then draw a
straight line from point-to-point. 77 This line is the official boundarybeyond it lies the deep seabed-and it can extend no further than 350 nautical miles from the territorial sea boundaries or "100 nautical miles from
the 2,500 met[er] isobath, which is a straight line connecting the depth of
2,500 met[ers]. ''7 8 States may use any collection of measurement options
they want to make their claim-for example, establishing some points
based upon sedimentary thickness and others at sixty nautical miles,
79
depending on which measurement will give them the most territory.
This is intended to allow wide-margin states to maximize their claims
73. UNCLOS, supra note 4, art. 76, para. 3.
74. See id. art. 76. Article 76(1) establishes that states have a claim to the shelf up to
200 nautical miles or an extended claim beyond that; the rest of article 76 creates a
formula for establishing limits for extended claims, but does not address basic claims of
200 nautical miles. Id. See also, CHURCHILL & LOWE, supra note 5, at 126 ("[A]reas of
the seabed which lie beyond the continental margin are included, so long as they are
within 200 miles of the coast.").
75. UNCLOS, supra note 4, art. 76(4)(a).
76. Id. art. 76(4)(b).
77. Id.
78. Id. art. 76(5); see Philip Allott, Power Sharing in the Law of the Sea, 77 AM.J. INT'L
L. 1, 18 (1983) (describing four potential cutoffs for continental shelf-200 nautical
miles, outer limits of continental margin, 350 nautical miles, or 100 nautical miles from
2,500 meter isobath).
79. See UNCLOS, supra note 4, art. 76 (article 76 provides measurement options but
does not say that states have to choose one approach or another, thus allowing states to
combine measurements); see also International Law Association, Legal Issues of the Outer
Continental Shelf, Res. 2/2006 (Jun. 4-8, 2006), available at http://www.ila-hq.org/down
load.cfm/docid/02D8F8E8DB56-49D9-BID780265535565E [hereinafter ILA Report]
(stating that article 76 provides flexible formula). Having established the shelf's limits,
UNCLOS goes on to divvy up rights to the resources found within it. See UNCLOS,
supra note 4, art. 77. Article 77 gives coastal states unfettered rights to explore and
exploit the natural resources within their continental shelves up to 200 nautical miles.
See id.States with shelves beyond 200 miles still have complete authority to explore and
exploit natural resources, but must share profits derived from these activities with the
international community by giving a percentage share to the ISA, which distributes the
money to UNCLOS parties. Id. art. 82.
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within the constraints of the outer limit requirements. 80

Oceanic experts agree that UNCLOS creates a monstrously difficult
formula for recognizing extended claims, 8 1 one far harder to employ and
verify than any of UNCLOS's other procedures for establishing oceanic limits. 82 To gather the submarine measurements that article 76 requires,
states have to take sonic images of the sea floor, identify the various parts
of the article 76 formula, figure out how to measure them based on the

different options permitted, and satisfy other procedural requirements. 83
This process is incredibly complicated, especially because states are
allowed to mix and match the formula's different elements, creating a jumble of hard-to-decipher points that belie straightforward delineation.8 4

Further, article 76 does not adopt the standard definitions and principles that geologists use to trace the continental margin. 8 5 Rather, it creates
80. See ILA Report, supra note 79, at 215 (revealing that the flexibility in article 76
formula is intended to allow states to maximize claims within established limits).
81. See L.D.M. Nelson, The ContinentalShelf. Interplay of Law and Science, in 2 LIBER
AMicORUM JUDGE SHIGERU ODA 1235, 1241-47 (Nisuke Ando, Edward McWhinney &
Rudiger Wolfrum eds., 2002) (describing difficulties arising from interpretation of article 76); Richard Haworth, The Continental Shelf Commission, in OCEANS POLICY, supra
note 62, at 147, 147-48 (describing some of the difficulties of determining limits
through the article 76 process and stating "this is not very, very simple at all").
82. See Macnab, supra note 35, at 2 ("[T]he Article requires a series of technical
procedures that are substantially more intricate than the determination of other types of
maritime limit [sic] and which represent a significant departure from common boundary-making practice."). States construct territorial sea and EEZ limits by measuring out
a set of latitudinal and longitudinal points that stretch twelve and 200 nautical miles,
respectively, past their territorial sea baselines. UNCLOS, supra note 4, arts. 3, 57, Territorial sea baselines either follow the low-water line along a State's coast or are constructed through well-established procedures of connecting with straight lines certain
points of latitude and longitude off the coast. Id. arts. 5, 7. States deposit charts or lists
of geographical points mapping their baselines with the UN. Id. art. 16. For regular
claims to the continental shelf-those not exceeding 200 nautical miles-states simply
have jurisdiction over the portion of the shelf that falls within their EEZ. See id. art. 76;
Victor Prescott, Resources of the Continental Margin and International Law, in CONTINENTAL SHELF LIMITS, supra note 71, at 64, 82. This process of establishing territorial, EEZ
and regular continental shelf jurisdiction is fairly straight-forward-the boundaries are
nothing more than a set of geographic points. It is also transparent-if one state wishes
to question another's boundaries, it can consult a map or satellite image of that country's coast and determine whether the territory claimed is limited to twelve nautical
miles.
83. See Macnab, supra note 35 at 2-9 (describing basic process of substantiating
article 76 claim); Prescott, supra note 82, at 72 (explaining that data collection for some
aspects of article 76 formula will be "a complex, lengthy, and probably expensive task");
see generally CONTINENTAL SHELF LIMITS, supra note 71 (providing detailed discussion of
technical and scientific processes involved in article 76 claim).
84. See Colson, supra note 54, at 103-07 (showing how different measurement combinations can produce four different extended claims).
85. See Comm'n on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, Scientific and Technical
Guidelines of the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, para. 1.3, U.N. Doc.
CLCS/Il (May 13, 1999) [hereinafter CLCS Guidelines] (explaining that CLCS needed to
create Technical Guidelines clarifying article 76's meaning because "Convention makes
use of scientific terms in a legal context which at times departs significantly from
accepted scientific definitions and terminology"); United States: President's Transmittal of
the United Nations Convention of the Law of the Sea and the Agreement Relating to the
Implementation of PartXI to the U.S. Senate with Commentary (Oct. 7, 1994), reprinted in
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a brand-new legal process for defining the shelf and marking its boundaries, which depends on sedimentary thickness and lines drawn from territorial baselines and 2,500-meter isobaths, not on scientific precision. 8 6
Article 76 does not abandon science-each element of a claim must be validated with geological and geomorphologic evidence, such as the measurement of the foot of the slope and the location of the 2,500-meter isobath. 8 7
It does, however, create its own process for obtaining, measuring, and
arranging this evidence that serves a legal definition of the shelf that is not
necessarily tied to physical reality-a state's actual continental margin
might end at the exact spot where the sedimentary rock is less than one
percent of the distance from the territorial baseline, but it might not.
Either way, the state can claim the seabed up to that point, but no further,
as its continental shelf.8 8 As a result, states cannot necessarily rely on
existing scientific understanding of the ocean floor when making claimsthey must gather and interpret data according to article 76.89
By skirting the edges of law and science, article 76 combines the
"influences of geography, geology, geomorphology, and jurisprudence" 90
to create a technical-legal delineation formula that raises more questions
than it answers: If traditional scientific understanding of the continental
margin is not applicable, how, exactly, should states employ article 76?9 1
What are the appropriate means of measuring sediment depth or 2,500-

34 I.L.M. 1393, 1426 (1995) [hereinafter U.S. Commentary] ("Although [article 76's]
formula uses certain geological concepts as points of departure, its object is legal not
scientific."); see also, Antunes & Pimentel, supra note 55, at 5 ("Some scientific-technical
terms incorporated in [the] provision have acquired a meaning that departs from their
geo-scientific, ordinary meaning.").
86. See Antunes & Pimentel, supra note 55, at 2-4 (emphasizing that article 76 creates legal delineation process, even though it incorporates scientific and technical
information).
87. See UNCLOS, supra note 4, art. 76; Antunes & Pimentel, supra note 55, at 2-6
(discussing the dual technical-legal nature of article 76); Colson, supra note 54, at 102
("Article 76 provides ... new . . . agreed categories of geological and geomorphological
facts that are legally relevant for the purpose of determining title to the outer continental
shelf ..
").
88. See UNCLOS, supra note 4, art. 76(1); Antunes & Pimentel, supra note 55, at 6
(explaining how legal definition of continental margin used in article 76 could result in
shelf claims that do not reach edge of continental rise or that stretch beyond it).
89. See generally Philip A. Symonds et al., Characteristicsof Continental Margins, in
CONTINENTAL SHELF LIMITS, supra note 71, at 25, 25-59 (describing how article 76 deals
differently with many aspects of continental margin than scientists and geologists).
90. D.M. JOHNSTON, THE THEORY AND HISTORY OF OcEAN BOUNDARY-MAKING 91
(1988).

91. See CLCS Guidelines, supra note 85, para. 1.3 (discussing how article 76's use of
many terms leaves their meaning unclear); Haworth, supra note 81, at 148 ("[Calling
article 76's terms] not clear is the gentlest of phrases that I can use."); Macnab, supra
note 35, at 2-10 (discussing many complications in article 76 formula); Piers R. R.
Gardiner, The Limits of the Area Beyond Nationaljurisdiction- Some Problems with Particular Reference to the Role of the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, in MprTIME BOUNDARIES AND OcEAN RESOURCES 65-68 (Gerald Blake ed., 1987) (discussing

several problems that arise in interpreting article 76).
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meter isobaths?9 2 How does article 76 regard geological formations like
submarine ridges? 9 3 How is the foot of slope measured? 9 4 What constitutes a straight line for the purposes of an outer boundary? 95 How should
96
experts deal with sedimentary wedge thickness that is not uniform?
Answering these questions requires interpreting article 76, which, given the
article's mixed technical-legal pedigree, means analyzing technical concepts through the lens of treaty interpretation-a tricky endeavor that
97
occurs during the process of making claims.

Thus, article 76 relies on hard-to-obtain and even-harder-to-decipher
submarine data, which states must input into a complex formula that
bases outer limits on undefined terms and confusing measurements. This
not only complicates the delineation process, but it also makes it hard for
other UNCLOS parties to verify that claims actually adhere to article 76
and do not infringe on the deep seabed. 98 For most states, it is difficultand expensive-enough to image and map their own seafloor, let alone that
of 152 of their fellow UNCLOS parties. 9 9
The states negotiating UNCLOS were aware of the challenges article
76 presented. 10 0 They understood that they were balancing competing
rights and did not want to allow wide-margin states to obfuscate legal and
technical vagaries to establish excessive claims. 10 1 Further, they knew that
92. See Haworth, supranote 81, at 148, 150-51 (describing difficulties of measuring
sediment wedge using article 76 formula); Symonds et al., in CONTINENTAL SHELF

LIMITS,

supra note 89, at 56-59 (describing problems in measuring sediment thickness and how
to measure 2,500 metre isobath).
93. See Antunes & Pimentel, supra note 55, at 19-21 (describing difficulty of determining original intent of states with regards to oceanic ridges); Symonds et al., supra
note 89, at 59 (describing potential for differences over how to address ridges under
article 76).
94. See Antunes & Pimentel, supra note 55 at 13-18 (discussing complex legal and
technical analyses that must go into interpreting foot-of-slope provision); Haworth, supra
note 81, at 149-150 (discussing how article 76 fails to explain how states should measure the maximum gradient or determine slope's base).
95. See Haworth, supra note 81, at 150.
96. See id. at 150-51.
97. See CLCS Guidelines, supra note 85, para. 1.3 (discussing how States will face
interpretational challenges when creating claims); Antunes & Pimentel, supra note 55, at
2-6 (discussing how article 76's mixed technical-legal nature requires using treaty interpretation to understand scientific and legal concepts)..
98. See Peter Prows, Tough Love: The Dramatic Birth and Looming Demise of UNCLOS
Property Law (and What Is to Be Done About It), 42 TEX. INT'L LJ. 241, 269-285 (2007)
(describing difficulties that many countries, especially developing ones, have with meeting the scientific and financial demands of article 76).
99. See Prescott, supra note 82, at 72 (stating that much of technical research
required for article 76 process is expensive); Prows, supra note 98, at 274 ("Given the
training and expertise required, even a very small desktop study is likely to be quite
expensive for a small country.").
100. See Allott, supra note 78, at 20 (discussing how parties knew that article 76 was
complex and that all had an interest in its application).
101. See CHURCHILL & LOwE, supra note 5, at 149 (describing potential for disputes
due to complexity of article 76 formula); Allott, supra note 78, at 20; Ted L. McDorman,
The Role of the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf. A Technical Body in a
Political World, 17 Irr'LJ. MARINE & COASTAL L. 301, 308 (2002) (stating that Commis-

sion's main concern should be whether state has made an exaggerated claim).
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a complicated boundary-setting process would be easy to manipulate,
meaning states might not trust the limits set and disputes would inevitably
arise, slowing the development of clear seabed jurisdiction. 10 2 Therefore,
the negotiators sought out a way to check states using article 76.103 They
10 4
came up with the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf.
II.

The Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf

A.

Mandate of the CLCS

Having created a complicated and unclear delineation formula,
UNCLOS parties sought to create an oversight mechanism to fulfill two
purposes: to safeguard against excessive claims on the part of wide-margin
states while ensuring that those states could fully realize their rights to the
shelf;' 0 5 and to legitimate proposed boundaries with an independent
stamp-of-approval to mitigate disputes between states. 10 6 To achieve this,
they established the CLCS-an independent commission composed of
twenty-one experts in geology, geophysics and hydrography charged with
10 7
reviewing states' article 76 claims.
Ironically, while the CLCS is supposed to clarify the article 76 process,
its own mandate-laid out in article 76 and Annex II of UNCLOS-is more
than a little murky. 10 8 According to UNCLOS, when a state wishes to
make a claim, it must submit information on its proposed limits to the
CLCS, which reviews it for compliance with article 76 and makes recommendations to the coastal state. 10 9 If the submitting state agrees with
these recommendations, it can establish "final and binding" limits based
upon them. 110 If it does not, it can resubmit its claim to the Commission
for a new set of recommendations."' That's it. UNCLOS does not explain
what the CLCS's recommendations should consist of, how many times a
state can redo its submission, what "on the basis of' means, or what hap102. See Macnab, supra note 35, at 10-11 (describing how disputes could arise during article 76 delineation); McDorman, supra note 101, at 319 (arguing that main purpose of CLCS is to legitimate boundaries provided by states in order to avoid disputes);
Shirley V. Scott, The Contribution of the LOS Convention Organizationsto its Harmonious
Implementation, in OCEAN MANAGEMENT IN THE 21ST CENTURY: INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORKS
AND RESPONSES

321-25 (Alex G. Oude Elferink & Donald R. Rothwell eds., 2004) (dis-

cussing CLCS's role in preventing conflict over continental shelf claims).
103. See Scott, supra note 102, at 315-21 (discussing negotiations for dispute settlement mechanisms).
104. See id. at 321-27 (discussing creation and function of CLCS).
105. See U.S. Commentary, supra note 85, at 1428 (stating that United States should
play a role in CLCS because it would help protect U.S. interests in its shelf while guarding against excessive claims by other states); McDorman, supra note 101, at 308 (noting
role of Commission in guarding against unwarranted claims).
106. See U.S. Commentary, supra note 85, at 1427 (explaining that CLCS is a mechanism to reduce uncertainty about limits and prevent disputes).
107. See Noel Newton St. Claver Francis, The Continental Shelf Commission, in OCEANS
POLICY,

108.
109.
110.
111.

supra note 62, at 141, 142-45.
See UNCLOS, supra note 4, art. 76(8); Annex II, art. 8.
Id. art. 76(8).
Id.
Id. Annex II art. 8.
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pens if a state establishes boundaries without the Commission's
approval.112
Faced with article 76's vague language, a number of commentators
and scholars have tried to figure out what, exactly, the CLCS is supposed to
do.11 3 Unsurprisingly, states negotiating the Commission split into two
familiar camps: wide-margin states and everyone else. Wide-margin states
argued that article 76 recognized coastal states' unique legal capacity to set
continental shelf limits. 1 14 To respect sovereignty, the CLCS could not

independently interpret article 76 and demand that states establish limits
based on its interpretations; states' understandings should govern, as long
as they fall within the realm of possible article 76 meanings.' 15 According
to the wide-margin states, any other approach would interfere with their
ultimate right to declare the extent of their territory. 1 16 Other states, however, pointed out that article 76 also concerned their rights to deep-seabed
resources; a robust Commission capable of making and enforcing independent determinations about article 76 was necessary to ensure that the
17
delineation process respected deep-seabed rights."
In the end, states agreed to what commentators have called article 76's
"ping-pong" process of submission-recommendation-resubmission." 8
Under this process, the CLCS is limited to "making recommendations"
about the boundaries proposed." 9 The state retains the ultimate right to
define its boundaries, but it must do so "on the basis" of the CLCS recommendations. 120 The state can submit a revised claim if it is displeased with
112. See id. art. 76, Annex 11; see also, Gardiner, supra note 91, at 69-70 (discussing
uncertainties that arise if country establishes boundaries that do not respect CLCS
recommendations).
113. See, e.g., Nelson, supra note 81, at 1237-47 (discussing the creation and role of
CLCS).
114. See UNCLOS COMMENTARY, supra note 52, at 1012-13 (quoting the Canadian
delegation arguing that CLCS could not infringe upon coastal state sovereignty by
imposing boundaries that differed from article 76); McDorman, supra note 101, at
313-14 (discussing implications of Canadian statement for interpreting mandate of
Commission).
115. See UNCLOS COMMENTARY, supra note 52, at 1012-13; McDorman, supra note
101, at 306 (discussing States' insistence that they, not the Commission, would ultimately declare limits under article 76); Nelson, supra note 81, at 1239-40 (describing
debate during negotiations over whether Commission would infringe on sovereignty of
coastal States).
116. See McDorman, supra note 101, at 313-14 (noting that several states raised concerns over possible infringements on national sovereignty).
117. See UNCLOS COMMENTARY, supra note 52, at 1012 (stating that Mongolia and
other delegations argued that Commission needed to respect interests of "land-locked
and geographically disadvantaged States").
118. See Gardiner, supra note 91, at 69 (describing how "ping-pong" process will
work); McDorman, supra note 101 at 306-07 (discussing "ping-pong" submission
process).
119. See UNCLOS, supra note 4, at art. 76(8) (restricting the CLCS's role to "mak[ing]
recommendations" to nations seeking to define their continental shelf).
120. See id.(noting the outer limits are "established by the coastal state"); McDorman, supra note 101, at 306 ("One certainty is that ... the costal state ... has the legal
capacity to set the state's outer limit . . . .") (emphasis removed).
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the Commission's position.121 In theory, ping-ponging results in a narrowing-down of differences between the state's and Commission's understanding of article 76 that checks states' interpretations but never infringes on
their right to set outer limits. 122 According to some scholars, by leaving
the ultimate authority to declare boundaries with states, article 76 adopts
the wide-margin states' negotiating position and limits the Commission
1 23
simply to verifying basic adherence to the formula.
In the Commission's own statements on its mandate, it often emphasizes its technical role. 1 24 The Commission is a technical review body
charged with making sure that states have followed article 76's technical
and scientific requirements, such as properly identifying the foot of the
slope and using sound scientific methods for measuring sedimentary
thickness. 125 Emphasizing the CLCS's technical nature also downplays its
role in the delineation process-the Commission is merely applying objective scientific facts and procedures to ensure that a submission complies
1 26
with certain minimum standards.
Dig a little deeper, however, and it becomes clear that the Commission
plays a much bigger part in shelf delineation than notions of ping-ponging
and technical review might indicate. As discussed, most of article 76's
terms and procedures are undefined. 1 2 7 This ambiguity goes beyond
uncertainty over what sorts of technical processes states should use, for
example, to measure sediment; the essential meaning of many elements of
the article 76 formula is unclear. 1 28 The Commission, therefore, cannot
121. See UNCLOS, supra note 4, Annex II, art. 8.
122. See Gardiner, supra note 91, at 68-71 (describing role of Commission and pingpong process).
123. See, e.g., McDorman, supra note 101, at 319-21. In this influential and widely
quoted article, Professor McDorman argues that the role of the Commission is simply
procedural and informational. By requiring that states submit information to the Commission, article 76 creates a procedural hurdle to setting limits. It does not, however,
specify what information a state should submit. This, Professor McDorman argues,
gives states wide latitude to decide how to approach the Commission process. After
states submit whatever evidence they see fit, Professor McDorman believes that the
Commission's purpose is purely informational-it provides recommendations on how
the state might improve its proposed boundaries, but has no authority to demand that it
make any specific changes to its proposals. See id.
124. See Francis, supra note 107, at 141-42 (highlighting technical nature of CLCS's
composition and role); Alexei A. Zinchenko, Emerging Issues in the Work of the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, in LEGAL AND SCIENTIFIc ASPECTS OF CONTINENTAL SHELF LIMITs 225-26 (Myron H. Nordquist et al. eds., 2004) [hereinafter LEGAL AND
SCIENTIFIC ASPECTS] (explaining that Commission is a "scientific organ" whose work
depends on technical and scientific precision)
125. See Francis, supra note 107, at 141-42.
126. See Zinchenko, supra note 124, at 225-26 (emphasizing that Commission
focuses on scientific facts and working with States to determine mutually acceptable
boundaries).
127. See supra Part l.B.
128. See Antunes & Pimentel, supra note 55, at 2 (stating that importation of scientific terms to article 76 leaves meaning of many terms unclear); Gudmundur Eiriksson,
The Case of Disagreement Between a Coastal State and the Commission on the Limits of the
ContinentalShelf, in LEGAL AND SCIENTIFIC ASPECTS, supra note 124, at 251 (stating that
many provisions of UNCLOS are unclear, including those related to CLCS); Haworth,
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simply review states' claims against a formulistic technical checklist-there
is no consensus on what, exactly, it would check. Further, article 76 is a
legal and technical provision-it incorporates geological and geomorphologic facts into a legal delineation process laid out in an international
treaty. 12 9 Figuring out what it means, therefore, requires interpreting a
130
treaty provision-an inherently legal, not technical, undertaking.
The Commission confronted article 76's ambiguity and legal nature
head on. In its earliest meetings, the CLCS created the Scientific and Technical Guidelines, which set out its understanding of most of article 76's
terms and explained what evidence it would like states to include in their
submissions. 13 1 Because there is no scholarly or government consensus
on how to interpret article 76, a number of the positions the Commission
takes in the Guidelines are controversial. 13 2 Nonetheless, while states are
not bound to follow the Guidelines, the Commission strongly urges them
to do so. 133 The Guidelines also are the only publically available comprehensive review and interpretation of article 76. This means that for reasons of expediency and strategy, states have an incentive to rely on the
Commission's interpretation of article 76 when establishing their claims
rather than coming up with their own interpretation. 13 4 Even where a
state offers an alternative interpretation, the Commission will naturally
compare it against the Guidelines to determine its validity. 13 5 The Commission, therefore, is taking a far more active role in unpacking the delineation process than wide-margin states and their advocates envisioned: it is
developing a uniform and highly influential interpretation of article 76.
Further, the article's procedures allow the Commission to use its interpretation to influence the final placement of boundaries, rather than simsupra note 81, at 147-52 (indicating some of unclear terms that Commission will have
to clarify in order to carry out its mandate); Nelson, supra note 81, at 1241-42 (stating
that an essential element of Commission's work is interpreting article 76 to clarify
ambiguous terms).
129. See Antunes & Pimentel, supra note 55, at 2-6 (noting article 76 is a legal provision and, thus, must be analyzed using principles of treaty interpretation).
130. See supra notes 85-104 and accompanying text (discussing technical-legal
nature of article 76).
131. See CLCS Guidelines, supra note 85, paras. 1.1-1.5 (discussing the purpose of the
Guidelines).
132. See McDorman, supra note 101, at 322-23 (taking issue with a number of positions Commission has expressed in Guidelines). For examples of varying interpretations of article 76, see ILA Report, supra note 79 (providing interpretations of many of
article 76's terms); Antunes & Pimentel, supra note 55, at 10-29 (attempting to interpret
provisions on meaning of continental shelf, measurement of isobaths and foot of continental margin, and ridge claims).
133. See CLCS Guidelines, supra note 85, para. 1.4 (explaining that Guidelines present
only one possible interpretation of article 76 and that Commission will accept claims
based on other legitimate interpretations, but encouraging states to use Guidelines in
compiling claims).
134. Some states might follow the Guidelines to avoid antagonizing the Commission
and smooth the approval process. For others, particularly developing countries, it will
be easier and cheaper to use the Commission's work than to hire lawyers and technicians to analyze the article independently.
135. See Nelson, supra note 81, at 1242.
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ply deferring to states' positions. 136 Article 76's "on the basis or'
requirement and the Commission's ability to reject a submission continuously forces many states to amend the boundaries they initially submit to
better reflect the Commission's position. 1 37 It is true that a state can stop
making submissions and can establish boundaries whenever it wants, even
without the Commission's approval. 138 But if the state wants its boundaries to be "final and binding," it must continue working with the Commis13 9
Resubmission
sion until they determine mutually acceptable limits.

allows a state to push back against the Commission's determination, but
the CLCS is not likely to accept a state's claim simply because the state
asserts it repeatedly.' 40 Further, the Commission's lack of direct enforcement powers does not mean that states will disregard article 76; many
but
international agreements have no direct enforcement mechanism,
14 1
terms.
their
with
comply
and
law
them
consider
still
states
136. See McDorman, supra note 101, at 319-21 (discussing how CLCS can shape
location of final border through procedural role).
137. See id. at 306 (describing how ping-pong review process is supposed to reduce
differences between state and Commission's positions until they concur).
138. See Zinchenko, supra note 124, at 225 (pointing out that article 76 permits state
to stop making submissions to CLCS any time it wishes).
139. See id. at 225-26. Zinchenko, a Legal Officer in the UN Division of Ocean
Affairs and the Law of the Sea and the Secretary of the CLCS, admits that states are free,
if they wish, to discount the Commission or disengage from the ping-pong process. He
argues, however, that "common sense" will keep states from doing so-without CLCS
approval, they cannot establish final and binding outer limits. See id.
140. See Nelson, supra note 81, at 1239-40 (arguing that Commission and states
must reach accommodation on recommendations because neither can completely
impose its will on the process); Zinchenko, supra note 124, at 225-26 (arguing that
CLCS cannot be too deferential to State's proposed limits because it is required to ensure
scientific and technical precision). Russia's reaction to the rejection of its proposals is
an early indication that the Commission will have actual power to influence limits. It is
unclear what Russia will propose when it finally makes a new submission, but the
amount of time and effort it has put in to its second try indicate that it is taking the
Commission's recommendations and role very seriously. Given how important the shelf
claim is for Russia, the fact that it is willing to alter its position indicates that the Commission will wield actual power in the delineation process. See Malakoff, supra note 25,
at 1878 (describing Russia's reaction to CLCS's rejection of its submission); Yuri
Zarakhovich, Why Russia is Bailing Out Iceland, TIME, Oct. 13, 2008, http://www.time.
com/time/world/article/0,8599,1849705,00.html (describing importance of offshore
oil to Russia).
141. See ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY: COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AGREEMENTS 4 (1995) ("[A]s a general rule, states
acknowledge an obligation to comply with the agreements they have signed."). The
UNCLOS negotiating history also indicates that deference to wide-margin states is not
necessarily article 76's paramount concern. Early versions of the article provided that
states had to set boundaries "taking into account the Commission's recommendations;"
this was later changed to the current language-"on the basis of"-despite objections by
some wide-margin states that the new phrasing gave the CLCS too much power and
unfairly infringed on their sovereignty. See Nelson, supra note 81, at 1239-40 (describing negotiating history and attempts by wide-margin States to maintain the old language). The fact that the stronger language stayed, despite these protests, suggests that
negotiators intended the Commission to have influence over boundary placement. Id. at
1240 (arguing that the language change indicates that states and Commission must
reach accommodation on proposed limits).

Cornell International Law Journal

Vol. 42

The Commission's power to shape outer limits is further heightened
by its unique position: it is the only international body mandated to review
the article 76 process. 142 The Convention does not explicitly establish an
independent body to which states can appeal the Commission's decisions. 14 3 States can question the Commission's interpretation, but they
cannot necessarily force it to modify an erroneous decision. 14 4 Some commentators argue that if a state establishes limits that do not conform to the
Commission's recommendations, other states can challenge those limits
before the International Tribunal of the Law of the Sea (ITLOS)-the adjudicatory body that hears disputes arising under UNCLOS-or the International Court of Justice (ICJ). 1 45 This could, in theory, lead to judicial
14 6
review of the Commission's recommendations and interpretations.
This Article does not attempt to resolve this question, except to say that an
ITLOS or ICJ claim may well be possible. Such claims, however, would be a
roundabout way for a state to challenge the Commission-the state would
have to set non-conforming limits, wait for another state to raise a claim
against it, and then challenge the Commission's findings as a defense to
the claim. Further, such a suit would probably take years to resolveneither ITLOS nor the ICJ has the technical expertise necessary to review
the Commission's determinations quickly-and it is not clear how court
precedent would feed into the Commission's work. 14 7 All of this means
that, at least for the moment, the Commission is the definitive body on
article 76-it is the only institution working systematically to interpret the
article's provisions and the only one with a clear mandate to review and
verify proposed limits. This exceptional position enhances its authority
148
over the delineation process.
Given the Commission's interpretive role and its ability to influence
142. As noted many times in this Article, article 76 only permits states who disagree
with the Commission's recommendations to resubmit. It never says what happens if the
state and Commission are unable to reach agreement and the state attempts to set
boundaries without the Commission's approval. See McDorman, supra note 101, at 306.
143. See Eiriksson, supra note 128, at 255 (noting that there is no appeals body to
check Commission's decisions or its adherence to UNCLOS provisions).
144. See Smith & Taft, supra note 71, at 20 (noting the ping-pong submission process
could theoretically continue forever, seemingly eliminating the possibility of appeal).
145. See Eiriksson, supra note 128, at 257-60 (arguing that states can challenge each
other's limits through third-party dispute settlement mechanisms); McDorman, supra
note 101, at 317-19 (arguing that "final and binding" does not mean determinative for
all States Parties to UNCLOS, so that states can challenge each other's boundaries
through outside adjudicatory mechanisms, such as ITLOS or ICJ). But see Smith & Taft,
supra note 71, at 20 (arguing that UNCLOS negotiators opted to exclude the Commission's determinations from third-party dispute settlement procedures).
146. See Eiriksson, supra note 128, at 257-60 (discussing how dispute resolution
under third-party mechanism might proceed).
147. See id. at 258-59 (acknowledging that ITLOS would have great difficulty interpreting Commission's findings and that other avenues of dispute resolution may not be
available).
148. See D.R. Rothwell, Building on the Strengths and Addressing the Challenges: The
Role of Law of the Sea Institutions, 35 OcEAN DEv. & INT'L L. 131, 133 (2004) (arguing
that Commission's quasi-judicial role will give it substantial influence on creation of
maritime boundaries).
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territorial claims, it appears to serve as an article 76 court. 14 9 This analogy, however, should not be taken too far. While the Commission's power
is undeniable, it does not have ultimate authority to declare article 76's
meaning and demand that states adhere to it precisely. 1 5 0 Through resubmission, states are also supposed to influence the Commission's interpretation of article 76.151 And it is undeniable that the ultimate authority to set
limits still rests with states. 15 2 Ping-ponging creates a dialogue between
the CLCS and states that is supposed to result in a definitive understanding of article 76's meaning and in clear seabed boundaries. 15 3 In this
regard, the CLCS is more of an administrative agency, mandated by
lawmakers to flesh out the details of a vague statutory scheme and to
develop a system to regulate its application, while, in theory, taking into
154
consideration the interests and concerns of those it is regulating.
As this section revealed, the Commission's mandate goes beyond
checking submissions for technical accuracy. It is responsible for interpreting article 76's legal and technical provisions, assessing the state's interpretation against its own, determining how to reconcile differences, ensuring
the state's technical and scientific data support the reconciled understanding, and recommending to the state that it either establish the proposed
boundaries or amend them. Even if the state does not immediately accept
the Commission's recommendations, they will, in all likelihood, influence
the boundaries the state ultimately establishes. The CLCS, therefore,
serves as something of an administrative-judicial body for outer continental shelf claims. As such, it plays a direct role in establishing and enforcing
the meaning of article 76, which gives it power to affect the extent of territorial shelf rights and the shape of the deep seabed.
B,

CLCS Procedures
To date, the Commission has received fifty-one submissions. 15 5 If all

149. See id. at 133 (referring to CLCS process as "quasi-judicial").
150. See Antunes & Pimentel, supra note 55, at 8 (stating that Commission's mandate
does not permit it to authoritatively interpret article 76 and impose its interpretation on
states).
151. See McDorman, supra note 101, at 306 (noting that the ping-pong process
should progressively reduce differences between positions of submitting state and
CLCS).
152. See Antunes & Pimentel, supra note 55, at 8 (noting that role of CLCS is providing validity to state's unilateral action).
153. See McDorman, supra note 101, at 306.
154. As is probably obvious, the point of this Article is that the CLCS does not sufficiently take into consideration all the interests and concerns it is supposed to-it is not
sufficiently accountable to UNCLOS parties. See infra Part III.
155. See CLCS Submissions, supra note 31 (providing regularly updated list of current
submissions). The parties to UNCLOS established a deadline for submissions of May,
2009. See UNCLOS, Meeting of States Parties, 11th mtg., Decision Regarding the Date of
Commencement of the Ten-Year Periodfor Making Submissions to the Commission on the
Limits of the Continental Shelf Set Out in Article 4 or Annex II to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, U.N. Doc. SPLOS/72 (May 29, 2001) [hereinafter 11th
SPLOS]. Given the technical complexity and financial demands of putting together a
submission, however, many countries pushed for an extension of that deadline, at least
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countries expected to make submission actually do so, roughly a third of
UNCLOS' 158 parties will be directly involved with the CLCS. 156
UNCLOS provides only a brief sketch of the process these states must follow when submitting their claims. The CLCS fleshed out the rest in its
Rules of Procedure, which the Commissioners created during early meetings. 15 7 The Rules, together with the Guidelines, provide insight into the
basic functions of how the CLCS engages in article 76 review.15 8
If a state believes it has an extended shelf claim, it must first carry out
extensive geological and geomorphologic testing to establish every piece of
the article 76 formula: the test of appurtenance; 1 59 the foot of the continental slope; points along the outer edges of the margin established either by
measuring sediment thickness or determining the sixty nautical mile
marker; the 2,500-meter isobath; and the straight lines that measure the
distance between the territorial sea baselines and the outer points, and
between the outer points themselves. 160 The Commission drafted the
16
Guidelines to facilitate this process. '
Once the tests and measurements are complete, the state must establish proposed boundaries and prepare a report for the Commission
explaining how it arrived at them.' 62 Under confidentiality rules developed by the CLCS, the state can declare any of the information and data it
for developing countries. See UNCLOS, Meeting of States Parties, 17th mtg., Report of
the Seventeenth Meeting of States Parties,para. 71, U.N. Doc. SPLOS/164 (July 16, 2007).
At the 2008 SPLOS Meeting, States Parties reached a decision that permits states to
satisfy the ten-year deadline by submitting preliminary findings on their outer limits, a
description of the status of their progress, and an intended final submission date. See
UNCLOS, Meeting of States Parties, 18th mtg., Decision Regarding the Workload of the
Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf and the Ability of States, Particularly
Developing States, to Fulfill the Requirements of Article 4 of Annex II to the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea, as well as the Decision Contained in SPLOS/72, Paragraph (a), para. 1(a), U.N. Doc. SPLOS/183 (June 20, 2008).
156. See generally U.N. Div. for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea, Chronological
Lists of Ratifications, Accessions and Successions to the Convention and the Related Agreements as at 6 November, 2009, http://www.un.org/Depts/los/reference-files/chronological lists of ratifications.htm# (last visited December 21, 2009) (providing list of all
nations party to UNCLOS).
157. See Comm'n on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, Rules of Procedure of the
Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, U.N. Doc. CLCS/40/Rev.1 (Apr. 17,
2008) [hereinafter Rules of Procedure].
158. See U.N. Div. for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea, Commission on the Limits
of the Continental Shef Selected Documents of the Commission, http://www.un.org/
Depts/los/clcs.new/commission documents.htm#Documents (providing access to the
Commission's "basic documents").
159. See CLCS Guidelines, supra note 85, para. 2.2 (discussing test of appurtenance,
through which a state seeks to demonstrate to CLCS that it is entitled to make a claim by
proving that its continental margin physically extends beyond 200 nautical miles).
160. See generally id. (describing steps countries must take to establish article 76
claim).
161. See id. para. 1.2.
162. See Rules of Procedure, supra note 157, r. 45(a). The report cannot propose
boundaries for areas where there is a dispute between states over boundary delineation,
which often occur where states shelves overlap. See id. r. 46(1); Annex I, art. 5(a).
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submits confidential, so that only Commissioners have access to it. 166 34
1
Thus far, most states have declared their entire submission confidential.
To alleviate a bit of the secrecy, the CLCS requires the submitting state to
include an executive summary explaining the basics of its claim, which the
CLCS releases to all UNCLOS parties so that they can review the proposal
and provide comments on aspects that interest them. 165 After the state
submits, the CLCS waits three months to begin review to give interested
states time to examine the executive summary and Commissioners time to
prepare. 166 To date, most submissions have received comments from a
variety of UNCLOS parties, including neighboring states disputing a spe16 7
cific boundary and other states with broader concerns.
163. Id. Annex II, arts. 2(1), 3(1). The Secretary-General and designated members of
the Secretariat may also have access within the scope of the process. See id. Annex I,
art. 3(1).
164. See CLCS Submissions, supra note 31. There are several reasons states might
make claims confidential. In compiling CLCS submissions, states gather a huge amount
of new data that, when analyzed, may reveal the location of many important mineral and
oil deposits. See Zinchenko, supra note 124, at 227 (discussing states' proprietary interest in the information it collects). States do not want to release this data to the rest of
the world before they have had a chance to assess exactly what they have, what it might
be worth, and how they want to regulate access. See Haworth, supra note 81, at 153
(describing interest of mining companies in confidentiality of seabed data). Further, if
the data show significant deposits, other UNCLOS parties might try to challenge shelf
boundaries, in an attempt to force the state to cede some of its wealth to the deep seabed
regime. A submitting state may not want its neighbors to know its proposed limits for
fear that they will spark a boundary dispute. See id. This is certainly what motivated
Russia to keep its claim secret. See Sean D. Murphy, U.S. Reaction to Russian Continental
Shelf Claim, 96 Am. J. INT'L L. 969, 969-70 (2002) (describing U.S. protest that Russia's
proposed Arctic boundaries might infringe on its own Arctic rights).
165. See CLCS Guidelines, supra note 85, para. 9.1.4 (describing contents of executive
summary); Rules of Procedure, supra note 157, r. 50 (stating that the U.N. SecretaryGeneral will promptly make executive summary available to public).
166. See Rules of Procedure, supra note 157, r. 51.
167. See CLCS Submissions, supra note 31 (providing access to all submissions and
comments); see, e.g., UNCLOS, Meeting of State Parties, 12th mtg., Note Verbale Dated 25
February2002 from the PermanentRepresentative of Japan to the United Nations Addressed
to the Secretary-Generalof the United Nations, Regarding the Submission Made by the Russian Federation on 20 December 2001 to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental
Shelf, Annex, para. 1, U.N. Doc. SPLOS/82 (Mar. 21, 2002) (disputing Russia's claim in
"Four Islands" region); Letter from Ann W. Patterson, U.S. Deputy Representative to the
United Nations, to Nicolas Michel, U.N. Under-Secretary-General and Legal Counsel,
Notification Regarding the Submission Made by Brazil to the Commission on the Limits of the
Continental Shelf (Aug. 25, 2004), available at http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs-new/
submissionsfiles/bra04/clcs-02 2004_los.usatext.pdf [hereinafter Patterson Letter]
(taking issue with Brazil's method of measuring sediment thickness in Vitoria-Trindade
feature of its claim). Non-neighboring states may be interested in submissions for a
variety of reasons. A number of countries, including the United States, Canada, Norway, the Russian Federation, andJapan, have developing deep-sea mining industries that
are interested in carrying out operations in areas with significant mineral deposits. See
The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-Generalon the Oceans and the Law of the
Sea, paras. 325 -43, U.N. Doc. A/54/429 (Sept. 30, 1999); ALEXANDRA MERLE POST, DEEP.
SEA MINING AND THE LAW OF THE SEA (1983) (analyzing the difficulties of developing a
comprehensive legal regime to govern deep sea mining, in part because of competing
national interest); Craig H. Allen, Protecting the Oceanic Gardens of Eden: International
Law Issues in Deep-Sea Vent Resource Conservationand Management, 13 GEO. INT'L ENvml.
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After the three-month period, the entire Commission holds a meeting
with the submitting state, during which the state presents the submission
and answers preliminary questions. 168 The Commission then appoints a
69
sub-commission to carry out a detailed technical and scientific review.'
The sub-commission is comprised of seven Commissioners, who are chosen by taking into account geographical representation and excluding
Commissioners who are nationals of the submitting state or of states with
whom the submitting state has a boundary dispute. 170 The CLCS has
decided that it is only obligated to consider comments related to boundary
disputes and, thus, it disregards comments from states related to other
71
issues.1
The sub-commission process is intense. During an initial review, the
sub-commission determines if the submission is complete, properly
formatted, and satisfies a preliminary analysis. 172 The sub-commission
then meets as many times as necessary to complete a full technical and
scientific review, which involves examining the data and methodology
underlying each element of the article 76 formula and determining
whether the data submitted is sufficient in quality and quantity to justify
the proposed boundaries. 17 3 The sub-commission uses the Technical
L. REv. 563, 578-79 (2001). These governments would be interested in monitoring the
article 76 process and ensuring claims (other than their own) are not excessive. Powerful developing countries, such as China, India, South Africa and Brazil, are deeply committed to the Common Heritage of Mankind principle, a developing country initiative,
and want to minimize infringements on the deep seabed. See MILES, supra note 56, at 42
(discussing advocacy of G-77 countries for expansive international seabed regime).
Finally, states that have or will make a submission want to verify that the Commission
applies article 76 consistently across claims so that no state receives preferential treatment. See Comm'n on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, Statement by the Chairman of
the Commission on the Limits of the ContinentalShelf on the Progress of Work in the Commission, para. 12, U.N. Doc. CLCS/54 (Apr. 27, 2007) [hereinafter CLCS 19th Session
Report] (discussing Brazil's comments to Commission regarding importance of consistent and fair application of criteria).
168. See Rules of Procedure, supra note 157, Annex Ill, Part II, para. 2.
169. See UNCLOS, supra note 4, Annex I, art. 5 (noting CLCS generally works
through sub-commissions); Rules of Procedure, supra note 157, Annex Ill, Part 1II, paras.
3, 5 (discussing sub-commission's examination of submission).
170. UNCLOS, supra note 4, Annex II, art. 5; see Comm'n on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, Statement by the Chairmanof the Commission on the Limits of the Continental
Shelf on the Progress of Work in the Commission, paras. 18-22 U.N. Doc. CLCS/42 (Sept.
14, 2004) [hereinafter CLCS 14th Session Report] (describing CLCS decision to use subcommission to examine Brazilian submission); Comm'n on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, Statement by the Chairman of the Commission on the Limits of the Continental
Shelf on the Progress of Work in the Commission, paras. 12-20, U.N. Doc. CLCS/32 (Apr.
12, 2002) [hereinafter CLCS 10th Session Report] (describing CLCS decision to use subcommission to examine Russian submission and establishing rules for composition and
function of sub-commission).
171. See CLCS 14th Session Report, supra note 170, at para. 17 (describing Commission decision to disregard U.S. comment on Brazil submission because Commission
only obligated to consider comments related to boundary dispute between states with
opposite or adjacent coasts).
172. See Rules of Procedure,supra note 157, Annex 1II, Part VI, para. 15 (outlining subcommission's initial examination of a submission).
173. See id. Annex Ill, Part IV (describing sub-commission's main review process).
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Guidelines to direct its review. 174 Sub-commissions are permitted to seek
outside technical or legal assistance in cases where Commissioners are
175
unsure of how to interpret a particular issue or a piece of evidence.
During this process, the sub-commission may request further information
or clarification from the submitting state whenever it has questions regarding the claim. 1 76 In addition, since 2006, sub-commissions have met with
the submitting state late in the sub-commission process to present their
preliminary recommendations and take the state's comments. 1 7 7 The state
cannot attend sub-commission meetings, however, unless the sub-commis178
sion invites them.
After completing its review, the sub-commission drafts recommendations on the proposed limits.

179

The recommendations take one of three

directions: finding that the data submitted supports the limits proposed
and recommending that the state adopt them; finding the information supports other limits and recommending that the state adopt those instead; or
finding that the data is insufficient to support any limits and recommending how the state can improve its testing and measurements to
develop boundaries consistent with article 76.180 The sub-commission's
recommendations next go to the entire Commission, which can accept or
modify them. 18 1 Again, the submitting state cannot attend these meetings. 1 8 2 Finally, the Commission forwards the final recommendations to
the state, which can either establish final and binding boundaries based on
183
If
them or make a new submission and start the process all over again.
the state decides to resubmit, it can work with the Commission to reduce
the disparities between the recommendations and its submission.' 8 4 The
174. See id. Annex 111, Part IV, para. 9(1) (stating the sub-commission will base its
review on the Guidelines); CLCS Guidelines, supra note 85, at paras. 1.1-1.3 (describing
reason for and use of Technical and Scientific Guidelines).
175. See Rules of Procedure,supra note 157, r. 57; Annex IlI, Part IV, para. 10(1)-(2).
176. Id. Annex III, Part IV, para. 10(1).
177. Id. Annex III, Part IV, para. 10(3)-(4); see also Comm'n on the Limits of the
Continental Shelf, Statement by the Chairman of the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf on the Progress of Work in the Commission, para. 36, U.N. Doc. CLCS/50
(May 10, 2006) [hereinafter CLCS 17th Session Report] (describing amendment to Rules
of Procedure to require meetings).
178. See Rules of Procedure, supra note 157, r. 52 (stating the coastal state must be
invited to participate in "relevant proceedings"); Annex III, Part VI, para. 15 (defining
"relevant proceedings").
179. See id. Annex Ill, Part V.
180. Id. Annex Ill, Part V, para. 12(4)-(6).
181. Id. r. 53(1).
182. See id. Annex III, Part VI, para. 15(1 bis.) (noting coastal state has opportunity to
make presentation to Commission following the sub-commission's recommendations,
after which the Commission will evaluate the recommendations privately); see also
Comm'n on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, Statement by the Chairman of the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf on the Progress of Work in the Commission,
paras. 18-27, U.N. Doc. CLCS/34 Jul. 1, 2002) [hereinafter CLCS 11th Session Report]
(recounting CLCS decision during consideration of Russian recommendations to not
permit state to attend Commission meetings).
183. See Rules of Procedure, supra note 1578, r. 53(4)-(5).
184. See McDorman, supra note 101, at 306 (noting states and CLCS work together in
ping-pong submission process).
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Commission also provides the recommendations to the Secretary-General,
who provides a summary of the recommendations to UNCLOS parties as
85

he sees fit.1

So far, the Commission has completed the recommendation process
for nine claims. 186 Though the complete submissions and recommendations are secret, it is known that the CLCS rejected large parts of Russia's
claim to the Arctic. 18 7 Russia is reconsidering its submission. 188 The
CLCS fully approved Australia and New Zealand's claims, enabling each
country to establish "final and binding" limits based upon its submission. 18 9 The CLCS should issue recommendations for several others in the
coming years. 190 Given the number of claims submitted, the CLCS is likely
to be reviewing submissions and resubmissions for at least the next decade.1 9 1 It will be a long and laborious process, but, as this section has
made clear, an extremely important one. Article 76 gives final definition to
rights over continental shelf resources and to the form of the universally
held deep seabed. UNCLOS parties empowered the CLCS to help interpret
and apply article 76 to guard against excessive claims, mitigate disputes
between parties over legitimate boundaries, and guarantee respect for the
rights of all states. The CLCS has established significant rules and procedures to carry out its mandate. The next section asks whether these procedures hold the Commission sufficiently accountable to the states under
whose authority it acts.
Ill.

Accountability and the CLCS

Over the past several decades, the increasing institutionalization of
international law and policy has led many to ask whether states have ceded
too much power to an international architecture that is unaccountable to
185. See Rules of Procedure,supra note 157, r. 54(3) (directing the Secretary-General to
give "due publicity" to the recommendations of the Commission). The Secretary-General must keep confidential information secret in accordance with the Rules. See id. at
Annex II,para. 3 (defining the circumstances under which confidential information may
be distributed).
186. See CLCS Submissions, supra note 31 (showing CLCS adopted recommendations
for claims submitted by Russia, Brazil, Australia, Ireland, New Zealand, a joint submission by several European nations, Norway, France, and Mexico).
187. See Malakoff, supra note 25, at 1878.
188. Id.
189. See New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs & Trade, New Zealand's Continental
Shelf and Maritime Boundaries, http://www.mfat.govt.nz/Treaties-and-lnternationalLaw/04-Law-of-the-Sea-and-Fisheries/NZ-ContinentalShelf-andMaritime-Boundaries.
php (last visited December 21, 2009); Stephen de Tarczynski, Australia: Diffident on UN
Grant of Larger Continental Shelf, INTER PRESS SERVICE (May 14, 2008), available at http://
www.ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=42359.
190. See CLCS Submissions, supra note 31 (revealing sub-commissions are examining
several claims); Malakoff, supra note 25, at 1878 (stating Russia is studying the Commission's recommendations).
191. See UNCLOS, Meeting of States Parties, 17th mtg., Issues Related to the Workload
of the Commission on the Limits of the ContinentalShelf- Note by the Secretariat,U.N. Doc.
SPLOS/157 (April 30, 2007) (discussing CLCS's unexpectedly heavy workload and several proposed solutions).
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the interests it supposedly serves. 192 In domestic systems, accountability
mechanisms that increase transparency and participation, require reasoned decision-making, and permit independent review of decisions, have
long been available to allow citizens and governments to check the power
of unelected administrative bodies.' 9 3 Internationally, unelected administrators now abound but accountability mechanisms are much less prevalent.19 4 The field of global administrative law (GAL) has developed in
response to this mismatch.' 9 5 GAL argues that international regime
accountability is necessary because it helps to ensure that regime actors
perform their assigned roles, constrains the ability of institutions to
96
infringe on state or individual rights, and can help promote democracy. 1
Based upon this normative foundation, GAL examines whether and how
accountability mechanisms can be introduced into the international
97
system. '
With the CLCS, UNCLOS parties brought the institutionalization
movement to the law of the sea. Since the Commission began considering
submissions in 2002, however, many have commented that its procedures
are secretive -submissions and recommendations are confidential, states
cannot attend Commission meetings, and Commissioners cannot speak
openly about the decision process.'19 However, most commentators made
these observations in passing; there has been surprisingly little sustained
analysis of the Commission's accountability. 19 9 The Commission has
emphasized that it is an "autonomous body" that has no formal relationship with states, and UNCLOS parties do not appear, thus far, to have
questioned this position.2 0 0 As most scholars have focused on the difficulty of the CLCS's technical mandate, rather than its procedural safeguards, it would seem that the CLCS is ripe for an accountability analysis.
192. See Grant & Keohane, supra note 36, at 29-30 (describing growing concerns
over accountability and democracy in international regimes).
193. See Kingsbury et al., supra note 37, at 31-42 (describing accountability mechanisms used in domestic systems and discussing their extension to international sphere).
194. See id. at 16 (discussing existence of accountability gaps in international
institutions).
195. See id. at 27-29.
196. See id. at 42-51 (discussing normative arguments for global administrative law:
intra-regime efficiency, protecting rights, and promoting democracy).
197. See id. at 28 (describing scope of global administrative law).
198. See, e.g., Macnab, supra note 35, at 2 (arguing that Commission's secrecy could
complicate application of article 76); Malakoff, supra note 25, at 1878 (stating that many
outside experts question the Commission's reliance on secrecy in article 76 review);
Bernard H. Oxman, The TerritorialTemptation: A Siren Song at Sea, 100 Am. J. INT'L L.
830, 838-839 (2006) (stating CLCS could benefit from more transparency).
199. But see Macnab, supra note 35 (arguing the CLCS should be more transparent).
Ron Macnab, a Canadian geologist who has worked extensively on continental shelf
issues, published the only in-depth analysis of any accountability aspects of the CLCS;
most other articles focus on technical issues.
200. See CLCS 1Ith Session Report, supra note 182, para. 38 (stating that Commission
received observer status at SPLOS meetings, increasing interaction with States Parties
otherwise limited by lack of formal relationship with states); Zinchenko, supra note 124,
at 230 ("The Convention does not envisage that the Commission should report to any
international organ .... ").
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Before diving into such an inquiry, however, it is first necessary to ask: who
cares? Is there any fundamental reason why the CLCS should be held
accountable? And if so, to whom and for what purpose?
A. The Need for an Accountable CLCS
Formally, "accountability" means "some actors have the right to hold
other actors to a set of standards, to judge whether they have fulfilled their
responsibilities in light of those standards, and to impose sanctions if they
determine that these responsibilities have not been met. '20 1 This definition assumes that the two sets of regime actors associate in such a way that
one set has a right to hold the other to account. 20 2 Such a relationship can
exist in two situations: where the account holder grants, delegates, or
transfers authority or resources to the accountee, so that the latter can act
in the interests of the former; or where the accountee infringes the account
holder's legal rights. 20 3 In international relations literature, however, discussions of accountability have blurred the formal definition somewhat by
applying the term to broader governance issues. 20 4 Holding an international institution accountable might refer to the establishment of rules and
procedures to allocate and regulate the authority to make decisions, or it
may refer to the need to ensure that actors are sufficiently responsive to the
legitimate interests of an identified group. 20 5 This use of accountability
does not necessarily depend on an accountor-accountee relationship, and
its central focus is the promotion of "just [and] equitable decisions by the
6
global regime in question.

'20

To cast as wide of a net as possible, this Article uses the term "accountability" to refer to an amalgam of the concepts just outlined. It establishes
that a formal accountability relationship exists between the CLCS and
UNCLOS parties. In examining the extent to which the Commission is or
is not accountable, however, it uses a broader understanding of the term.
This Article asks whether UNCLOS parties have access to sufficient mechanisms to ensure that the CLCS respects their rights and addresses their
legitimate interests. Assurance of this protection may require formal
accountability mechanisms through which states can demand that the
CLCS explain its decisions and, if necessary, impose sanctions. 20 7 It may
also involve procedures to regulate CLCS decision-making or mechanisms
focused on transparency, reason-giving, and participation that can check
201. Grant & Keohane, supra note 36, at 29.
202. See id.
203. See Richard B. Stewart, Accountability and the Discontents of Globalization: US and
EU Models for Regulatory Governance, 1 (Sept. 20, 2006) (Discussion Draft, New York
University Law School Hauser Colloquium on Globalization and its Discontents), available at http://www.iilj.org/courses/documents/Stewart.Accountability9-20-06.pdf.
204. See Grant & Keohane, supra note 36 (using accountability to refer to broader
global governance issues).
205. See Stewart, supra note 203, at 1 (stating these concepts are distinct governance
mechanisms, rather than types of accountability mechanisms).
206. See id. at 4.
207. See id. at 1 (describing basic purpose of formal accountability mechanisms).

2009

Deciding Who Owns the Ocean Floor

the Commission's actions and enhance its responsiveness to states' interests without formal dispute settlement or sanctions. 20 8 Discussing
accountability in this sense may not be formally precise, but it is in line
with the way many scholars use the term 20 9 and permits consideration of a
2 10
wider array of accountability mechanisms.
The first step in analyzing the accountability of an international institution is determining to whom, if anyone, that institution owes account
and why. 2 11 For the CLCS, there is one fairly clear response: the Commission should be accountable to UNCLOS parties because it is acting in their
interests through the authority they delegated to it. 212 Before the CLCS,

states had complete sovereignty over territorial boundary-setting. 2 13 Creating the Commission forced them to cede some of that control: today, "final
and binding" seabed boundaries cannot exist without Commission
approval. 2 14 Thus, while states remain key players in the delineation process, they have delegated to the Commission some of their original authority over seabed boundaries. 21 5 This means that, though it is an
independent body, the Commission acts on behalf of states through a
grant of power that derives, in part, from their sovereign rights. Under a
classical understanding of accountability, therefore, the CLCS should
2 16
answer to UNCLOS parties.
Beyond this very formalistic reasoning, there are two additional arguments for CLCS accountability to UNCLOS parties that are, perhaps, more
normatively compelling. First, one of the central arguments for accountability in international organizations has been their ability to affect states'
rights. 21 7 For example, the International Monetary Fund has the power to
force countries receiving its loans to adopt certain macro-economic policies. 2 18 This creates a situation in which unelected international bureau208. See id. at 9 (describing proposals to improve accountability in global
organizations).
209. See, e.g., Grant & Keohane, supra note 36 (using accountability in the broad
sense).
210. See Stewart, supra note 203, at 8-9 (describing how different types of mechanisms can be used to address responsiveness to affected interests and regulated decisionmaking).
211. See id. at 10 (stating that analysis should determine "who is accountable [to]
whom for what, with what sanctions, and under what standards and procedures if
any.").
212. See Grant & Keohane, supra note 36, at 42 ("[Holder of authority] can be called
to account by those who authorized them as well as by those affected by them.").
213. North Sea Continental Shelf (F.R.G. v. Den; F.R.G. v. Neth.), 1969 I.CJ. 3, 22
(Feb. 20) (noting states exercise sovereign authority over their territory).
214. See UNCLOS, supra note 4, art. 76.
215. See supra Part II.A.
216. See Stewart, supra note 203, at 10 (describing accountability as a function of
relationship between accountor and accountee).
217. See Kingsbury et al., supra note 37, at 46-48 (discussing rights protection as
normative justification for global administrative law).
218. See Ofer Eldar, Reform of IMF Conditionality: A Proposalfor Self-Imposed Conditionality, 8 J. IN'L ECON. L. 509 (2005) (proposing new procedure for IMF lending to
enhance transparency and accountability in IMF's use of conditionality).
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crats are constraining the right of states to set domestic policy. 2 19
Development of mechanisms to increase the accountability of the IMF to its
client states could help correct the balance of power and ensure that the
2 20
IMF is not unduly interfering with a country's sovereign rights.
Considering the mandate of the CLCS described in Part II, it is also
susceptible to a rights-affecting argument for accountability. The Commission is responsible for helping to interpret article 76, which defines the
extent of states' various seabed rights, and for helping to determine how
the article applies to actual claims to shelf jurisdiction. 2 2' This means that
the Commission plays a central role in establishing the breadth of coastal
state jurisdiction and the extent of the deep seabed. As a result, the Commission's work directly affects the rights of UNCLOS parties. Therefore,
those parties should be able to hold the CLCS accountable to ensure that it
is respecting their rights and responding to their concerns and interests.
Scholars also have argued for accountability in international regimes
because it can "uphold and secure the cohesion and sound functioning of
an institutional order. '2 22 In other words, mechanisms that promote transparency and reason-giving or regulate decision-making could help ensure
that the CLCS adheres to and competently performs its mandate. 2 23 This,
in turn, will help ensure that the continental shelf regime functions as
intended. 2 24 This argument has particular resonance here due to the tricky
nature of the Commission's job. When reviewing shelf claims, it must
accurately interpret the vague and complicated delineation formula, consistently assess and reconcile its interpretation against those of submitting
states, and give states recommendations that will, eventually, lead them to
adopt boundaries that conform to article 76.225 It must also consider and
safeguard the interests of other UNCLOS parties in the deep seabed, even
though they are not represented directly in the review process. 22 6 It is easy
to imagine many ways that the CLCS might make an error during any of
these steps. If the Commission does not have to explain or justify its
actions to states or if states cannot observe its work, then there is no way to
make sure that it is adhering to its mandate; this could result in final
boundaries that do not actually respect article 76.
Further, an unaccountable CLCS could undermine the entire article
76 process. The development of a clear, uncontested seabed jurisdiction
requires all of the UNCLOS parties to trust and respect the boundaries
219. See id. at 514.
220. See id. at 523-28 (discussing basic function and benefits of implementing proposed procedure).
221. See supra Part I.
222. Kingsbury et al., supra note 37, at 44.
223. See id. (stating international administrative organizations require normative procedures to ensure proper performance, though such mechanisms often function
internally).
224. See id.
225. See supra Part II.
226. See Macnab, supra note 35, at 10 (noting CLCS must consider interests of three
categories of parties: the submitting state, the CLCS, and other states).
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established. If they have no way to verify that the CLCS is working as
intended, however, parties will be less likely to buy into to its determinations. 22 7 This may cause submitting states to ignore recommendations
when setting limits or encourage other parties to dispute the limits set by
other states. Already, the relatively small number of shelf claims submitted
have generated a number of comments and criticisms from UNCLOS parties. 228 These comments indicate that setting limits can and will be contentious and that states are poised to contest those boundaries that they
believe are arbitrary or unfair. In addition, many states have called for
greater participatory rights in CLCS meetings, 229 and Commissioners
themselves have stated that opaqueness or perceptions of bias or unfairness will undermine the Commission's work. 230 Thus, accountability
could be an important means to ensure the CLCS fulfills its role in the
continental shelf regime, and, by extension, that the regime actually results
in the creation of firm seabed boundaries.
B. Accountability Gaps in the CLCS
An examination of the Commission's procedures reveals significant
potential for accountability gaps. 2 3 ' The Commissioners decide whether
claims meet the article's requirements and formulate recommendations
without any state participation. 23 2 Submissions and recommendations are
kept secret. 233 The CLCS created the Rules of Procedure and the Technical

and Scientific Guidelines with minimal input from the states affected by
them. 23 4 The accusations of secrecy made by experts and government officials reinforce the instinct that the CLCS has serious accountability
227. See id. at 14 (arguing that greater transparency would "promote broad acceptance" of boundaries approved by the Commission).
228. See, e.g., Patterson Letter, supra note 167 (providing text of U.S. comment on
Brazil proposal). See generally CLCS Submissions, supra note 31 (providing access to
comments on all current submissions).
229. See UNCLOS, Meeting of States Parties, 15th mtg., Report of the Fifteenth Meeting
of States Parties,para. 74, U.N. Doc. SPLOS/135 (July 25, 2005) [hereinafter 15th SPLOS]
(discussing concerns of states over CLCS procedures that restrict their access to
meetings).
230. See Francis, supra note 107, at 144 (emphasizing importance of Commissioners
avoiding influence of politics); Malakoff, supra note 25, at 1878 (noting CLCS Chairman
favored reducing secrecy in Commission). Academic and shelf experts have echoed this
concern. See, e.g., Macnab, supra note 35, at 2 (stating secrecy of Commission might
generate problems in dealing with submissions); Oxman, supra note 198, at 838-39
(noting potential advantages of increased transparency in Commission's work).
231. See supra Part II.B.
232. See Rules of Procedure,supra note 157, Annex Ill, Part VI, para. 15 (defining types
of proceedings to which submitting state has right to attend).
233. See Macnab, supra note 35, at 11-12 (discussing confidential nature of CLCS
work).
234. See U.N. Div. for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea, Rules of Procedure of the
Commission, http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs-new/commissionrules.htm (last visited Dec. 21, 2009) (discussing process of drafting the Rules of Procedure); U.N. Div. for
Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea, Scientific and Technical Guidelines,http://www.un.
org/Depts/los/clcsnew/commissionguidelines.htm (last visited Dec. 21, 2009) (discussing process of drafting the Guidelines).
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problems. To ferret out these lapses and determine if reform is necessary,
this section examines three areas: the Commission's make-up; its work in
reviewing submissions; and the process of creating the Scientific and Technical Guidelines and Rules of Procedure.
1.

Composition of the Commission

The Commission is a body of twenty-one experts in the areas of geology, geophysics and hydrology. 235 Individual nations nominate Commissioners and UNCLOS parties elect them to renewable five-year terms,
taking into regard equitable geographic distribution. 23 6 Commissioners
serve in their individual capacity, but nominating states are responsible for
covering their costs of service. 2 37 The full Commission meets at the UN
Headquarters in New York as often as necessary, typically two times a year;
all Commissioners are expected to attend. 2 38 For each claim, the CLCS
chooses sub-commissions whose members remain in New York after full
Commission meetings, often for several weeks, to review the
23 9
submission.
This brief description reveals several aspects of the CLCS that are
interesting from an accountability standpoint. Most obviously, elections
seem to make the Commissioners directly accountable to UNCLOS parties.
There are, however, several problems with CLCS elections as an accountability mechanism. First, UN elections often depend more on intra-UN
politics than substance; many parties cast ballots based on regional and
national alliances or favors owed, not on a nominee's actual positions or
work.2 40 Second, because the Commission conducts much of its work in
secret, states do not know how various Commissioners have acted or what
positions they have taken, leaving them with little substance upon which to
235. UNCLOS, supra note 4, Annex II, art. 2(1).
236. Id. Annex 11, arts. 2(1)-(2), (4).
237. Id. Annex 1I, art. 2(1), (5).
238. See Rules of Procedure, supra note 157, rs. 2(1), 4(1), 7(4).
239. See id.Annex I1l, Part IV, para. 9(2) (noting sub-commissions generally function
at UN Headquarters).
240. Most UN elections, including those for the CLCS, are a two-stage process. First,
to ensure fair geographical representation, seats are divided up among the organization's
five regional groups, each of which chooses a slate of candidates, often through procedures that have little to do with a candidate's merits. See UNCLOS, Meeting of States
Parties, 18th mtg., Decision on the Allocation of Seats on the Commission on the Limits of
the ContinentalShelf and the International Tribunalfor the Law of the Sea, para. 2, U.N.
Doc. SPLOS/182 Uuly 9, 2008) (allocating seats on Commission by region); David M.
Malone, Eyes on the Prize: The Quest for Nonpermanent Seats on the UN Security Council,
6 GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 3, 5 (2000) (explaining various regional selection procedures for
Security Council seats). Second, the general membership (either the entire General
Assembly or, in the case of the CLCS, all States Parties to UNCLOS) votes on the
regional candidates. Ideally, the preliminary process produces an "agreed slate"-the
exact number of candidates needed to fill the region's slots-and the general vote simply
confirms the regional decision. See Malone, supra at 5 (stating that Member States usually prefer "agreed slate"). When this does not happen, however, nominating countries
engage in spirited electioneering to secure their nominee's seat, often resorting to vote
trading, promises of aid, and "cult of personality" campaigns to win. See id. at 12-17
(describing various tactics used to win Security Council seats).
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base votes. Though alliance-building and favor-trading are a natural part of
most electoral processes, they do little to enhance CLCS accountabilitywhether a Commissioner remains on the Commission depends more on
whether his sponsoring state has the political clout necessary to garner
sufficient votes than on his actual positions on article 76 and his work on
the Commission. 24 1 Finally, elections alone are a rather blunt means to
improve accountability and could actually be counter-productive. Though
the Commission must be accountable, it also must maintain its independence-unbiased review is an essential part of article 76.242 Threatening
to remove support for a Commissioner's candidacy likely would bully them
into unquestioningly accepting the positions of states most interested in a
particular submission. Subtler mechanisms focused on transparency, reason-giving, participation and review are likely to produce more reasoned
and consistent responsiveness without sacrificing independence.
Elections raise a related but contrary concern: they could make individual Commissioners too accountable to their nominating states. If a
Commissioner's ability to participate depends upon his state's nomination
and financial support, it will be hard for him to put aside national interests
and act independently. 2 43 This is not just a hypothetical problem-Commissioners themselves have recognized the difficulty. 244 Bias in the CLCS
would seriously undermine the article 76 process as well as attempts to
ensure accountability to all UNCLOS parties, not just the ones footing the
bill. The support requirement could also skew the Commission in favor of
wealthier countries. 2 45 In the past, costs have impeded developing countries from nominating Commissioners or sending elected members to
meetings. 2 46 UNCLOS parties created a voluntary trust fund to defray
expenses, 24 7 but as submissions increase and sub-commission demands
241. See Malone, supra note 240, at 11-18 (describing how finances and political
clout are key to winning UN elections).
242. See Francis, supra note 107, at 144 (commenting on importance of independence to CLCS work); Macnab, supra note 35, at 11 (discussing importance of transparency to CLCS's mandate).
243. See McDorman, supra note 101, at 312 (discussing issues created by financial
relationship between Commissioners and nominating states).
244. See Francis, supra note 107, at 144 (questioning whether Commissioners can be
independent and unbiased if relying on support of nominating state).
245. Commentators have raised similar concerns about other international bodies.
See, e.g., Lawrence 0. Gostin, Meeting Basic Survival Needs of the World's Least Healthy
People: Toward a Framework Convention on Global Health, 96 GEO. L.J. 331, 364 (2008)
(observing considerable influence of wealthy nations in setting policy of health
organizations).
246. During the early years of the Commission, the Commissioners regularly discussed the financial difficulties that developing states faced in sponsoring Commissioners and pressed UNCLOS Parties to create a trust fund to help defray these costs. See,
e.g., Comm'n on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, Statement by the Chairmanof the
Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf on the Progress of Work in the Commission, paras. 5, 19, U.N. Doc. CLCS/18 (Sept. 3, 1999) [hereinafter CLCS 6th Session
Report] (stating Commission discussed creation of trust to facilitate participation by
developing countries).
247. UNCLOS, Meeting of States Parties, 10th mtg., Decision Regarding the Establishment of a Voluntary Trust Fund for the Purpose of the Commission on the Limits of the
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intensify, countries and Commissioners are concerned that funding will be
inadequate and decrease participation by developing countries. 2 48 Caving
to pressure from particular states is not accountability; finding ways to mitigate financial and electoral pressures will be necessary to create a truly
responsive CLCS.
2.

Submission Review

Examining accountability in the article 76 review process is particularly important because it is the heart of the CLCS' work; it directly concerns both states' rights and the Commission's role in the continental shelf
regime. 2 4 9 As with elections, the process appears to have one obvious
accountability mechanism: states can resubmit their claims, which is supposed to provide an opportunity to dispute and influence the Commission's interpretation of article 76.250 In theory, this is true, but there are
several problems with resubmission as the main or only point of accountability in the submission process. First, the CLCS needs to be accountable
to all UNCLOS parties, but resubmission gives only submitting states a
window into the Commission's work. Second, even for submitting states,
resubmission is far from an ideal accountability tool. It does not provide
an independent review-states just revise their arguments and send them
back to the same decision-maker. Third, resubmission is not particularly
useful if states do not understand how the Commission makes its decisions or considers their arguments. The rest of this section shows that the
Commission's current procedures are inadequate with respect to these
points and hobble the utility of resubmission as an accountability
mechanism.
States have limited rights to participate in the CLCS submission process. Under the Commission's Rules of Procedure, submitting states are
allowed to attend sub-commission meetings that the CLCS "deem[s] relevant," defined as the initial meeting where the state presents its claim,
meetings to which the sub-commission invites the state, and meetings
through which the state seeks to clarify its submission. 25 ' Otherwise,
states are not permitted to observe or participate in sub-commission or
Commission deliberations. 25 2 Many governments have criticized the privacy of Commission meetings, and Commissioners themselves have
pointed out that it gives the CLCS a secretive air. 25 3 In 2006, the CLCS
Continental Shelf, U.N. Doc. SPLOS/58 (June 6, 2000) [hereinafter 10th SPLOS Trust
Fund Decision].
248. See CLCS 14th Session Report, supra note 170, para. 54 (discussing concerns of
Commissioners that governments might not be able to finance stays for sub-commission
meetings).
249. See supra notes 155-85 and accompanying text (discussing submission process).
250. See McDorman, supra note 101, at 306 (describing ping-pong process as one
which narrows down differences between state and Commission interpretations).
251. Rules of Procedure,supra note 157, Annex Ill, Part VI, para. 15.
252. See id. Annex I, para. 4(1).
253. See Comm'n on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, Statement by the Chairmanof
the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf on the Progress of Work in the Commission, paras. 39-47, U.N. Doc. CLCS/48 (Oct. 7, 2005) [hereinafter CLCS 16th Session
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responded to these comments by amending the Rules of Procedure to
require the sub-commission to meet with the submitting state late in the
review process to present preliminary recommendations and receive comments from the submitting state. 2 54 It also permitted the submitting state
to make a presentation on matters related to its submission prior to Commission deliberations on sub-commission recommendations. 25 5 These
changes have increased contact with Commissioners during the recommendation-writing process and give submitting states a somewhat more
expansive view into the Commission's work. 25 6 Nonetheless, states still
may not attend sub-commission and Commission deliberations, meaning
they do not have unfiltered access to the Commission's decision-making
process or a complete picture of the debates, issues, and factors that inform
257
the final recommendations.
Closed meetings are not the only practice clouding the Commission's
work. The confidentiality requirements in the Rules of Procedure forbid
the CLCS from keeping notes, so there are no formal records of any of the
review work, including sub-commission meetings and the final Commission review of recommendations. 2 58 The Chair of the Commission produces an annual report presented to UNCLOS parties at the annual States
Parties on the Law of the Sea meeting (SPLOS), but this report focuses on
final decisions rather than on the specifics of the debate and discussion
that informed them. 25 9 The newly introduced late-stage presentation by
Report] (describing Commission discussion about complaints from some states, including Brazil, over exclusion from Commission meetings); 15th SPLOS, supra note 229,
para. 74 (discussing complaints from states that led to Commission discussion on state
involvement in meetings).
254. See Rules of Procedure, supra note 157, Annex Ill, Part IV, para. 10(3)-(4); see
also, CLCS 17th Session Report, supra note 177, paras. 31-45 (discussing Commission's
decision to amend Rules of Procedure).
255. See Rules of Procedure, supra note 157, Annex Ill, Part VI, para. 15(1 bis.); see
also, CLCS 17th Session Report, supra note 177, paras. 39-45 (discussing Commission's
decision to amend Rules of Procedure).
256. See UNCLOS, Meeting of States Parties, 16th mtg., Report of the Sixteenth Meeting
of States Parties, para. 82, U.N. Doc. SPLOS/148 (July 28, 2006) (reporting some states
thanked Commission for amending Rules of Procedure to improve state access to Commission deliberations).
257. See id. (noting that some states did not believe that amendments fully addressed
their concerns about exclusion from the Commission process). The amendment to the
Rules of Procedure permitting a final presentation to the Commission explicitly states
that the Commission and submitting state may not discuss the recommendations and
that the Commission must deliberate on them in private. Rules of Procedure,supra note
157, Annex Il, Part IV, para. 15(lbis.); see also, 15th SPLOS, supra note 229, para. 74
(discussing states' concerns over limited access to Commission meetings and potential
inconsistencies in Rules of Procedure).
258. See Rules of Procedure,supra note 157, Annex II, para. 4(3).
259. See CLCS 19th Session Report, supra note 167, paras. 14-44 (giving procedural
details of Commission's consideration of Brazil, Australia, New Zealand, and Norway's
submissions but providing no details on content of discussions); see also Comm'n on the
Limits of the Continental Shelf, Statement by the Chairman of the Commission on the
Limits of the Continental Shelf on the Progress of Work in the Commission, paras. 19-44,
U.N. Doc. CLCS/56 (Oct. 4, 2007) [hereinafter CLCS 20th Session Report] (giving perfunctory statements on Commission's consideration of several submissions); CLCS 17th
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the sub-commission provides an opportunity for the submitting state to
question the sub-commission on its decisions, but the sub-commission is
not required to provide any particular level of detail in its presentation or
to produce a written record of its deliberations that would endure beyond
the meeting. 2 60 Further, though this meeting occurs at an "advanced
stage" in the process, the recommendations presented are not finalized and
26 1
do not necessarily reflect the sub-commission's ultimate product.

The Commission does face one requirement to explain its decisionmaking in writing: its recommendations to the submitting states must
include the "rationale" on which they are based. 26 2 This is an important
condition that can shed light on how the Commission applies article 76
and help guide the state in re-working its submission. However, there are
no real requirements for what the Commission must include in this rationale-it might include a detailed discussion of how the Commission interpreted and applied various provisions of article 76, or it might just state
that the submission failed to meet certain requirements and explain what
information to include in a new submission. 263 If the state does not agree
with the CLCS's recommendations, the only way to contest them is through
resubmission, 2 64 where the process is exactly the same as the initial oneclosed and opaque-and it is difficult for the state to determine how the
Commission is evaluating its response.
Session Report, supra note 177, paras. 29, 31-45 (stating Commission discussed issue of
how to correctly connect line of outer edge of continental margin to 200 nautical-mile
line but providing no details of discussion, and recounting Commission's debate about
amending Rules of Procedure but focusing on procedural issues and not in-depth discussion of Commissioners' positions and debate); Comm'n on the Limits of the Continental
Shelf, Statement by the Chairman of the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf
on the Progress of Work in the Commission, paras. 14-16, U.N. Doc. CLCS/9 (Sept. 11,
1998) [hereinafter CLCS 4th Session Report] (stating that Commission deliberated on
Scientific and Technical Guidelines but providing no details on deliberations); Comm'n
on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, Statement by the Chairman of the Commission on
the Limits of the Continental Shelf on the Progress of Work in the Commission, paras. 13-15,
U.N. Doc. CLCS/7 (May 15, 1998) [hereinafter CLCS 3rd Session Report] (stating that
Commission debated Rules of Procedure, but providing no information on content of
debate).
260. See Rules of Procedure, supra note 157, Annex III, Part IV, paras. 10(3)-(4).
261. See id. Annex Il, Part IV, para. 10(3). The Rules require that the meeting occur
at an "advanced stage" of the process, but state that the sub-commission will present its
views on "part or all" of the submission. Id. This indicates that the sub-commission
does not even need to have completed its deliberations before meeting with the state. In
addition, the Rules state that the sub-commission will continue deliberations and draft
its recommendations after meeting with the state. See id. Annex I1l, Part IV, para. 10(5)
(providing that the sub-commission will continue deliberations and draft recommendations after meeting with submitting state). Staging the meeting this way permits the subcommission to take into consideration the state's views when drafting the recommendations. This is important in terms of providing states increased access to the recommendation-writing process, but still means that states do not see the full recommendations
before the sub-commission forwards them to the Commission. See id.
262. Id. Annex Ill, Part V, para. 12(4).
263. See id. The Rules of Procedure simply say "rationale;" they do not elaborate on
the meaning of the requirement. See id.
264. See UNCLOS, supra note 4, Annex II, art. 8.
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The submission process is even more closed to the rest of the UNCLOS
parties. These countries have no participatory opportunities whatsoever,
as all meetings are off-limits to them. 265 Though they can submit comments to the Commission on Submissions, the Commission has discretion
to decide what to do with them and is not required to explain whether or
how it considered the opinion. 26 6 Further, the Commission created very
strict confidentiality provisions that permit states to declare confidential
any of the data they submit with their proposal. 26 7 This means that submitting states do not have to make their submissions public, and other
parties cannot see or analyze them. The executive summaries are often
fairly perfunctory and of limited utility to those states that are truly concerned about boundaries proposed. 2 68 The Commission's recommendations are similarly restricted-the CLCS transmits full recommendations
and explanations to the submitting states and the UN Secretary-General, 2 69 while other parties receive only a summary of the recommendations provided by the Secretary-General. 2 70 This means that the
Commission never has to give a full account of its decisions to all UNCLOS
parties, even though all are interested in and affected by its work. Furthermore, as they never see full recommendations or the submissions, it may be
difficult for parties to challenge them.
As has been shown, the Commission's closed review process raises
significant concerns. Limited participatory opportunities and transparency make it difficult for states to know whether the Commission is
accurately and consistently interpreting article 76. Recommendations provide insight into the Commission's reasoning, but they may not fully
explain the Commission's decision-making process and only the submitting state has access to them. Combined with the lack of a clearly defined
external review process, this means there is almost no significant check on
265. See Rules of Procedure, supra note 157, Annex I, para. 4(1).
266. The Rules of Procedure do not include any provisions on non-submitting states'
participation or responses to comments. In reports, the chairperson simply notes that
the Commission received a comment and what it chose to do with it. See, e.g., CLCS
14th Session Report, supra note 170, paras. 16-17 (discussing U.S. comment sent to
CLCS regarding Brazilian submission); CLCS 10th Session Report, supra note 170, para.
10 (noting that Commission received comments on Russian submission, but never
explaining whether Commission considered them).
267. See Rules of Procedure,supra note 157, Annex I.
268. See Russian Submission, supra note 27 (providing access to Russia's brief executive summary and supporting documents, as well as the comments of other nations).
Few countries found this summary helpful; see, e.g., Permanent Mission of Canada to
the United Nations, Notification Regarding the Submission Made by the Russian Federation
to the Commission on the Limits of the ContinentalShelf, (Jan. 18, 2002), availableat http:/
/www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs-new/submissions files/rusOl/CLCSO12001_LOS_
CANtext.pdf (stating that the Russian executive summary did not provide sufficient
information for Canada to properly analyze the claim); see also CLCS Submissions, supra
note 31 (providing access to all current submissions, executive summaries, and
comments).
269. See Rules of Procedure,supra note 157, r. 53(3) (directing CLCS to submit recommendations to UN Secretariat, which will transmit a copy to the submitting state).
270. See id. r. 54(3) (stating Secretary-General will give "due publicity" to the Commission's recommendations).
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the Commission's interpretation and application of article 76, even though
it directly impacts states' rights. 2 7 1 This is particularly worrisome given
that interpreting article 76 involves both legal and technical analysis; Com2 72
missioners are technical experts but could easily get the law wrong.
Further, the Commission engages in an interpretive dialogue with states,
and it is supposed to assess and update its position based on alternative
explanations they provide. 2 73 This is a delicate and nuanced process, so it
is hard to trust that the CLCS will always get it right without effective
accountability mechanisms.
Extensive secrecy also makes it more difficult to convince states to
trust the CLCS process and accept its recommendations. There are many
ways for CLCS review to go awry: Commissioners might misinterpret article 76, misunderstand evidence submitted by a state, or be biased in favor
or against a particular state. 274 States know this and might be less likely to
accept the CLCS' recommendations if they have no way to verify that the
review is legitimate or feel that the CLCS arbitrarily has excluded them
from the process. In sum, the lack of accountability in the submission
process has the potential to undermine the continental shelf regime.
Though concerns about confidentiality and independence must be taken
into account, enhanced accountability is still warranted.
3.

The Technical and Scientific Guidelines and the Rules of Procedure

As discussed above, the Scientific Guidelines and Rules of Procedure
are important contributions to the extended claim process. The Guidelines
provide a baseline interpretation of article 76 that is the Commission's
2 75
main review tool and that many states rely on to fashion their claims.
The Rules of Procedure clarify how the Commission carries out review,
including procedures on the sub-commission process, state participation
in meetings, and confidentiality. 2 76 The Guidelines, therefore, directly
influence states' claims, and both the Guidelines and Rules control how the
Commission functions, the extent to which it adheres to its mandate, and
the trust and respect it receives from states.
The CLCS developed the Guidelines and Rules mostly at closed meetings, though it permitted some state participation. For the Rules, the UN
Secretary-General provided an initial set of recommendations that the
271. See supra notes 142-48 and accompanying text (discussing unique position of
CLCS as only international body charged to review article 76 submissions).
272. See supra notes 81-104 (discussing article 76's technical and legal nature).
273. See supra notes 118-23 and accompanying text (discussing ping-pong review
process).
274. See generally Macnab, supra note 35, 10-16 (discussing some potential problems
associated with CLCS review process).
275. See supra notes 131-35 and accompanying text (providing general discussion of
Guidelines).
276. See generally Rules of Procedure, supra note 157 (defining processes through
which CLCS functions).
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Commissioners discussed and amended. 2 77 Before adopting the final document, the Commission presented it to UNCLOS parties at an early
SPLOS. 2 78 Parties were permitted to submit comments, but, as with sub-

mission review, the Commission had discretion to consider or disregard
them, and it never explained whether or how the comments influenced the
final document. 2 79 The Commission created the Guidelines from scratchbreaking into drafting groups, each of which was responsible for researching and developing rules for a particular element of article 76.280 It then
presented drafts to interested states at an open meeting, where it
responded to questions and took comments. 28 1 Again, the Commission
never explained the extent to which the meeting shaped the Guidelines, if
at all. 28 2 The Commission has no formal procedures for regularly reviewing or updating the Guidelines or for allowing states to comment on
them. 28 3 Though the Commission has amended the Rules in response to
277. See Comm'n on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, Statement by the Chairmanof
the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf on the Progress of Work in the Commission, paras. 8-13, U.N. Doc. CLCS/1 (June 30, 1997) [hereinafter CLCS 1st Session
Report] (explaining process through which Commission considered, amended, and
adopted rules based on draft prepared by UN Secretariat); United Nations Secretariat,
Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf. Its Functions and Scientific and Technical Needs in Assessing the Submission of a Coastal State, U.N. Doc. SPLOS/CLCS/INF/1
(June 10, 1996) (providing Secretariat's initial assessment of Commission's needs).
278. See Comm'n on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, Statement by the Chairman of
the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf on the Progress of the Work in the
Commission, para. 11, U.N. Doc. CLCS/4 (Sept. 17, 1997) [hereinafter CLCS 2nd Session
Report] (noting Commission refrained from adopting Annex I to the Rules of Procedure
until states considered it at a Meeting of States Parties).
279. CLCS 4th Session Report, supra note 259, paras. 18-20 (noting that Commission
considered comments from states before formally adopting Rules); CLCS 3rd Session
Report, supra note 259, para. 15 (explaining that CLCS would forward parts of the Rules
to states for comments, though not disclosing how the CLCS would consider such
comments).
280. See CLCS 3rd Session Report, supra note 259, para. 10-13 (discussing decision to
create an editorial committee, subdivided into drafting groups, to complete Guidelines).
281. See U.N. Div. for Oceans Affairs and the Law of the Sea, UNCLOS and the
Delineation of the ContinentalShef Opportunities and Challenges for States, http://www.
un.org/Depts/los/clcs new/documents/clcsopen.htm (last visited Dec. 21, 2009)
(describing open meeting); Comm'n on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea and the Delineation of the Continental Shelf
Opportunities and Challenges for States (Apr. 20, 2000), available at http://www.un.org/
Depts/los/clcsnew/documents/CLCS_26.pdf (providing transcript of open meeting
and presentation materials); Comm'n on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, Statement
by the Chairman of the Commission on the Limits of the ContinentalShelf on the Progress of
Work in the Commission, paras. 4-6, U.N. Doc. CLCS/21 (May 5, 2000) [hereinafter
CLCS 7th Session Report] (describing open meeting).
282. See CLCS 7th Session Report, supra note 281 (revealing that states were allowed to
comment, but not addressing extent to which CLCS considered comments). The Commission formally adopted the Guidelines prior to the 2000 Open Meeting. See Comm'n
on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, Statement by the Chairman of the Commission on
the Limits of the Continental Shelf on the Progress of Work in the Commission, para. 14,
U.N. Doc. CLCS/12 (May 18, 1999) [hereinafter CLCS 5th Session Report] (stating that
Commission adopted Guidelines); CLCS 6th Session Report, supra note 246, para. 9
(stating that Commission adopted Annexes II, II1 and IV of Guidelines).
283. The Guidelines are occasionally discussed at scientific conferences organized by
governments and research institutes, and experts attending these meetings sometimes
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complaints that states aired at SPLOS meetings, particularly those regarding state participation in the sub-commission process, the Commission
284
faced no requirement to respond to state pressure.
The Guidelines and Rules, therefore, are important parts of the Commission's work that touch on areas where accountability should be a concern-states' rights and how the Commission functions. Unfortunately,
the CLCS has developed and amended both the Guidelines and Rules in
ways that lack consistency and transparency, as well as restrict state participation. There are a few accountability mechanisms in the current CLCS
framework-elections and resubmission-but each has significant limitations. Similarly, SPLOS meetings, open meetings and externally organized
conferences provide only an informal, ad hoc channel for communicating
with Commissioners.
These accountability gaps highlight potentially serious problems with
the CLCS. Without participatory opportunities, transparency, clearly
explained decision-making, and external review, there is no way for states
to ensure that the CLCS accurately and consistently interprets article 76
and adheres to its UNCLOS mandate. Despite the fact that the Commission's power implicates states' rights, there are no significant checks on its
exercise of that power. Further, an unchecked CLCS is likely to be a less
effective institution-states are unlikely to trust determinations made in a
black box. Therefore, it is urgently necessary to increase the CLCS'
accountability to UNCLOS parties. The following sections suggest some
mechanisms that could facilitate this transformation.
IV.

New Accountability Mechanisms for the CLCS

Following the lead of global administrative law literature, this section
examines how mechanisms modeled on domestic administrative regimes
could be used to increase the CLCS' accountability to UNCLOS parties.
Focusing on participatory opportunities, transparency, reasoned decisionmaking requirements, and review, this section proposes reforms to the
CLCS' structure and procedures that could help check the Commission's
role in interpreting and applying article 76 and increase respect for, and
faith in, its decisions. Before jumping into these proposals, however, it is
question or challenge aspects of the Guidelines. See Antunes & Pimentel, supra note 55
at 7, 13-14 (describing two such incidents). It is possible that these discussions could
inform or shape the Commission's interpretation of the Guidelines and article 76 in
general. See id. at 7 (describing how one exchange apparently caused Commission to
rewrite portion of Guidelines prior to adoption). This entire process is ad hoc, however,
and there is neither any guarantee that the Commission will react to criticisms, nor any
record of how it has dealt with past discussions. Further, attending a conference is
expensive and many UNCLOS parties, particularly developing countries, may not be
able to participate.
284. See CLCS 17th Session Report, supra note 177, paras. 31-45 (describing Commission's decision to introduce the late-stage meeting between the sub-commission and submitting states meeting and the final state presentation); CLCS 16th Session Report, supra
note 253, paras. 39-47 (discussing the Commission's decision to amend the Rules to
permit states to attend sub-commission meetings the Commission deemed relevant).
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necessary to consider the concerns that have led the CLCS to function as
secretly as it does. Doing so will help illuminate the potential limits of
reform and ensure that proposals take into account legitimate concerns
about the effects of increased Commission accountability.
A. Limitations to Reform
The CLCS' closed approach to its substantive work is not without reason. As the Commission is supposed to be an unbiased review body, it is
understandably concerned that transparency could interfere with candid,
independent decision-making. 285 If states could attend meetings or read
transcripts of deliberations, they might be able to pinpoint Commissioners
who disagree with them and pressure them to shift positions. This worry
is particularly acute because parties nominate and elect the Commissioners, who might fear losing their positions if they openly criticized a state's
proposal. 28 6 Pressure would most likely come from those states that have
nominated Commissioners. Their influence is mitigated only somewhat
by the fact that submitting-state Commissioners do not participate in the
sub-committee for their nominating state-they still participate in the full
Committee review, where the recommendations are amended and receive
final approval and they can still advocate for their states with Commission
colleagues. 28 7 Other parties also could pressure Commissioners by threatening not to vote for them during elections or to nominate an alternative
candidate. 288 Such concerns about bias and improper influence are valid;
if permitting greater state participation undermines Commissioners' independence, then UNCLOS parties might start to question the legitimacy of
the review process and the limits the Commission approves. So, while
reforms must open up the Commission's processes, they must also respect
and maintain its independence.
Though the introduction of accountability mechanisms is intended to
improve trust in the Commission, it could have the opposite effect by weakening the Commission and fueling disputes. Lifting confidentiality and
increasing access to submissions and recommendations, for instance,
could result in other parties picking fights with submitting states rather
than learning to rely on the integrity of the review process. It might also
discourage submitting states from providing full information for fear that it
will go public, undermining the quality of submissions and the Commission's ability to conduct review. Further, giving submitting states too
285. See CLCS 16th Session Report, supra note 253, para. 42 (stating that some Commissioners objected to allowing greater state participation in the sub-commission process because it could endanger the Commission's impartiality); Macnab, supra note 35,
at 11 (discussing need for "objective" CLCS); McDorman, supra note 101, at 311-13
(describing importance of Commission's independence from states).
286. See CLCS 16th Session Report, supra note 253, para. 42; Francis, supra note 107,
at 144 (discussing potential for State pressure to bias Commissioners' decision-making).
287. See Rules of Procedure,supra note 157, r. 42(1) (defining eligibility for membership on sub-commissions).
288. See supra notes 240-48 and accompanying text (discussing accountability issues
arising from CLCS election process).
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much information about deliberations or creating an external review mechanism could encourage them to challenge the Commission rather than
work with it to create mutually acceptable boundaries. This would interfere with UNCLOS' ping-pong review process. This Article, therefore, seeks
to identify subtle reforms that increase responsiveness without sacrificing
the balance UNCLOS negotiators struck.
B. Reform Proposals
1. Composition and Financing of Commission
To increase the role of UNCLOS parties in areas like submission
review, it is first crucial to reduce some of the power they-or at least some
of them-already wield. If Commissioners' positions hinge on the nomination and support of their sponsoring states, they will be nervous about
28 9
criticizing or opposing that state in more transparent proceedings.
Therefore, UNCLOS parties should amend or otherwise reach an agree290
ment on changing the CLCS' nomination and financing procedures.
First, the UN Division on Oceans Affairs and the Law of the Sea
(DOALOS), an administrative branch responsible for oceans issues, including the continental shelf, 29 1 should be responsible for drawing up a list of
Commission candidates, taking into account the same geographic requirements currently imposed on state nominations. UNCLOS parties could
then vote on these candidates in line with current procedure. As a'specialized administrative body that works closely with UN Members, DOALOS
has expertise in article 76 issues and understands the concerns of
UNCLOS parties. 29 2 Given this, it could provide an informed, but more
independent, list of candidates. Nomination through DOALOS could help
relieve some of the pressure on Commissioners, as their positions will not
depend on continued political support from their home countries.
Once elected, Commissioners should be supported through either general UN funds or a UNCLOS funding mechanism that mandates contributions from all parties. 29 3 In addition to increasing independence, relieving
289. See Francis, supra note 107, at 144 (observing the dangerous influence of states'
financial support of Commissioners).
290. UNCLOS lays out procedures for amendments in Articles 312 and 313. See,
UNCLOS, supra note 4, arts. 312-13. UNCLOS parties have also used less formal procedures for "re-interpreting" the Convention's terms, however, and it is possible that a
similar approach could be used here. See, e.g., l1th SPLOS, supra note 155 (reinterpreting UNCLOS to extend time limits).
291. See U.N. Div. for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea, The Division for Ocean
Affairs and the Law of the Sea, its Functions and Activities, http://www.un.org/Depts/los/
doalosactivities/about doalos.htm (last visited Dec. 21, 2009) (describing history and
functions of DOALOS).
292. See id.
293. Reform along these lines is already under discussion amongst UNCLOS parties.
See CLCS 17th Session Report, supra note 177, at Annex (recommending adoption of
resolution providing funding for CLCS from UN). As the number of submissions has
increased, Commissioners have had to spend more time in New York and the costs of
sponsoring a Commissioner have skyrocketed. See id. Given this, many Commissioners
have called parties to switch to a different funding scheme, in order to ensure participa-
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countries of the requirement to finance Commissioners could result in a
more balanced Commission with more representatives from developing
countries. As discussed, UNCLOS parties have long recognized the need to
establish a funding mechanism to aid developing countries that have an
interest in nominating Commissioners but lack the funds to do so. 2 94
Though there are certainly a greater number of qualified experts in developed countries, current and potential Commissioners from developing
countries might not be able to participate if the costs of sponsorship are
too high.

2.

2 95

The Commission's Role in Legal Interpretation

As article 76 has a mixed legal-technical pedigree, Commissioners are
often confronted with competing legal claims, even though they have only

technical expertise. 29 6 The Commissioners can seek outside legal assis-

tance to help them interpret difficult issues. 29 7 Neither article 76 nor the
Rules require them to do so, and the Commission does not appear to have
articulated any general principles regarding when it will or will not seek
legal advice. 298 Further, when advice is obtained, Commissioners simply
tion of experts from the developing world. See CLCS 20th Session Report, supra note 259,
para. 51 (reporting that Commission reiterated to states importance of draft resolution
discussed at 17th session); CLCS 17th Session Report, supra note 177, at Annex.
294. See, e.g., 10th SPLOS Trust Fund Decision, supra note 247 (revealing the States
Parties recommended the UN General Assembly establish a voluntary trust fund to
enable developing states to participate).
295. See CLCS 14th Session Report, supra note 170, para. 54 (discussing Commissioners' concerns that costs might make it impossible for some Commissioners to participate in sub-commission process).
296. See Antunes & Pimentel, supra note 55, at 9 (explaining that CLCS must deal
with technical and legal questions and noting that it would be helpful if the Commission
included legal experts).
297. In its early years, the Commission faced many preliminary legal questions
regarding article 76, including confidentiality of submissions and how to deal with disputes between states. See CLCS 5th Session Report, supra note 282, para. 5 (stating that
Commission requested and received a legal opinion from U.N. Legal Counsel on issue of
confidentiality of submissions and Commission deliberations); CLCS 3rd Session Report,
supra note 259, para. 5 (discussing Commission's decision to forward to SPLOS question of submission where there was dispute between states); CLCS 2nd Session Report,
supra note 278, para. 12 (stating that Commission forwarded several questions to States
Parties for discussion at SPLOS). In more recent years, the CLCS has continued to see
the Legal Counsel's advice on broad article 76 questions. See Comm'n on the Limits of
the Continental Shelf, Statement by the Chairman of the Commission on the Limits of the
ContinentalShelf on the Progress of Work in the Commission, para. 13, U.N. Doc. CLCS/44
(May 3, 2005) (stating that Commission forwarded to Legal Counsel question of
whether states could provide additional information to Commission after making initial
submission). The Commission is also permitted to seek outside legal advice for questions that arise while reviewing submissions, but it is not entirely clear from where it
obtains this advice, as records of sub-commission meetings are non-existent or confidential. See Rules of Procedure, supra note 157, r. 57 (stating that Commission can seek
advice of outside specialists), Annex I, para. 4(1) (declaring that the deliberations of
sub-commissions must remain confidential).
298. The Rules of Procedure permit the Commission to seek outside advice from specialists to the extent that doing so is "necessary" or "useful," presumably including legal
advice. See Rules of Procedure, supra note 157, r. 57, Annex ll, Part IV, para. 10(2)
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apply it to the case at hand-the Commission does not publish any of the
advice it receives, meaning there is no way for states to know what areas of
article 76 require interpretation and how legal experts are interpreting
them. 299 Therefore, there is no immediate check on how the Commission
is dealing with legal questions. It could easily be overstepping its mandate
or just getting the law plain wrong. And though recommendations might
give submitting states some post hoc insights on legal interpretation, the
legal precedent
Commission is not building a publicly available body 30of
0
that other states can use to prepare their submissions.
To deal with these problems, the CLCS should create a Legal Counsel's
office staffed by lawyers who specialize in the law of the sea. 30 1 The Legal
Counsel should review submissions to advise the Commission and the submitting state on what areas involve legal, as well as technical, questions.
The Counsel's office should provide the Commission with legal interpretations for any unclear issues, seeking outside assistance when necessary.
The Commissioners would be responsible for integrating this advice into
the final recommendations, but the Counsel's office should also review
those recommendations to ensure basic legal soundness. The Commission
and the Legal Counsel should also publish regular updates for all UNCLOS
parties that explain the legal issues that have arisen in submissions and
how they have been interpreted. This will help guarantee that Commissioners are obtaining legal advice whenever necessary, provide a means
through which states can check interpretations, and help build precedent
to facilitate the article 76 process.
3.

Increasing Participationof Submitting State in Submission Process

Enhancing participatory opportunities for submitting states would
provide a check on the Commission and improve understanding of the process and the recommendations it produces. The late-stage meeting
between the state and sub-commission is an important step toward
enhanced participation, but more can be done to increase transparency.
Further reforms, however, cannot be permitted to interfere with the independence and technical precision of the review process. Nomination and
financing reforms will mitigate pressure but not eliminate it; Commissioners still may feel inhibited by intense, in-person scrutiny. Active state participation could well turn review into an adversarial process that sacrifices
technical virtuosity for politics. Considering this, the Commission does
(allowing sub-commission members to request advice from outside experts on behalf of
the Commission). The Commission has complete discretion to decide when to seek
advice, however, and the Rules provide no guidelines on when or how it should do so.

See id.
299. See id. Annex II, para. 4 (imposing obligation to maintain confidentiality of all
details discussed during deliberations).
300. See Prows, supra note 98, at 276 (noting CLCS confidentiality policies prevent
states from learning from the submissions process of other states).
301. A number of experts have criticized or questioned the absence of lawyers on the
Commission. See, e.g., Antunes & Pimentel, supra note 55, at 9 (calling the Commission's lack of legal expertise "surprising").
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not need to open all meetings to submitting states but rather continue to
ratchet up interaction with the state at all stages of the review process.
First, the Commission should require a sub-commission to hold at
least three meetings with the state during its review, at which it presents
the status of its deliberations and the state has the opportunity to comment
and ask questions. These meetings could occur after the preliminary
review, in the middle of the technical review, and, as already happens, late
in the process. 30 2 At the moment, the Commission informally has agreed
to hold such meetings with states, but only the final meeting formally is
required in the Rules, which means earlier interaction might not happen
30 3
consistently and could change when new Commissioners are elected.
Further, many meetings between the sub-commission and submitting state
involve the Commissioners questioning the state, not responding to concerns. 30 4 Though meetings could be combined for convenience, the Commission must increase formal opportunities for the submitting state to
learn about and question the progress of its submission.
Second, at the late-stage meeting the sub-commission should be
required to provide the submitting state with a draft of written recommendations rather than having discretion to discuss only those areas of its
work it wishes. The state should be given a uniform period of time to
review and comment on the recommendations. The sub-commission
should be required to consider these comments and incorporate them, as
appropriate, into their final recommendations.
Finally, the Commission should permit states to attend, as observers,
the meeting at which the full Commission considers recommendations.
This would provide an overview of how the sub-commission dealt with different issues and reveal how the Commission, as a whole, views or interprets elements of article 76. At this stage, however, the sub-commission
will have hammered out most of the most contentious and difficult issues;
consequently, there is less concern that the state will be able to influence
the process unfairly. Overall, the reforms presented here would increase
transparency and participation without interfering with the flow of subcommission discussions or exposing Commissioners to undue pressure.
4.

IncreasingAccess of Other UNCLOS Parties to the Submission Process

Enhancing accountability to submitting states will address only one
side of the article 76 equation because those nations have no motivation to
ensure that the Commission restricts excessive claims. Other UNCLOS
parties must, therefore, be given greater access to the submission process;
302. See Rules of Procedure, supra note 157, Annex II, Part IV, para. 10(3).
303. See id.
304. See id. Annex III, Part VI, para. 15(1 bis.) (stating that the coastal state may
present its views relating to the submission, but the Commission will not enter a
dialogue).
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this will also improve their understanding of and trust in limits set. 30 5 To
achieve such access, the Commission must rework confidentiality requirements so that more data is made public. Though the Commission appears
to believe that UNCLOS or other UN rules require it to give expansive protection to submitting states, it is not clear from where this impression
comes. 30 6 UNCLOS itself makes no mention of confidentiality with regard
to article 76, and no free-standing UN agreements obligate the CLCS to
respect state requests for confidentiality. 30 7 Further, as governments
research and substantiate claims, they uncover vast amounts of new information about the ocean floor; one could argue that they are obligated to
make this information-and thus their claims-public under UNCLOS pro30 8
visions on marine scientific research.
One UN legal officer has stated that states have proprietary rights in
their submissions because of the substantial time, effort, and money they
invest in completing them. 30 9 It is, therefore, the states' prerogative to
decide when and with whom to share data not the Commission's. 3 10 It is
certainly true that many countries recognize proprietary rights in the fruits
of physical, creative, and financial effort, also known as intellectual property.3 1 1 Such rights, however, do not spring from some mysterious universal or natural source-they are created by domestic and international
statutes and treaties that confer on creators exclusive ownership in certain
types of innovative or intellectual endeavors. 3 12 Neither UNCLOS nor any
305. See Macnab, supra note 35, at 14 ("Allowing third parties an opportunity to evaluate the factors that prompted approval or rejection of a given submission . .. should
help promote broad acceptance of outer limits that survive the scrutiny of the CLCS.").
306. See Prows, supra note 98, at 275-76 n.232 (questioning why Commission
believes it must maintain complete confidentiality).
307. See id.
308. See UNCLOS, supra note 4, art. 244 (requiring states to make public all information gathered through marine scientific research); Prows, supra note 98, at 275 n.232.
309. See Zinchenko, supra note 124, at 227-28.
310. Id. at 228.
311. See generally Wenwei Guan, The Poverty of Intellectual Property Philosophy, 38
HONG KONG L.J. 359, 359-60 (2008) (providing a brief history of intellectual property
law). The World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) maintains a comprehensive
database of the intellectual property laws of more than 180 countries; see World Intellectual Property Organization, Member States, http://www.wipo.int/members/en/ (last visited Dec. 21, 2009).
312. For example, the United States Congress has passed several statutes granting
intellectual property rights: the Copyright Act, which gives authors rights to their "original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression" 17 U.S.C. § 102
(2007); the Lanham Act, which confers exclusive usage rights to any "word, name, symbol, or device... used by a person.., to identify and distinguish his or her goods," also
known as trademarks, 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2007); and the U.S. Patent Act, which grants
ownership to anyone who "invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine,
manufacture, or composition of matter," 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2007). The World Trade
Organization's (WTO) Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights Agreement
(TRIPS) requires WTO Members, of which there are currently 153, to implement similar
laws. See World Trade Organization, Members and Observers, http://www.wto.org/
english/thewto -e/whatis e/tif_e/org6_e.htm (last visited Dec. 21, 2009); Trade-Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights art. 41(1), Apr. 15, 1994, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299
[hereinafter TRIPS].
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other international treaty grants states proprietary rights in the fruits of
their seabed mapping. In other words, states have no legally mandated
right to secrecy-the Commission's decision to grant confidentiality is a
policy choice.
Moreover, regardless of whether ownership is accorded as a matter of
law or policy, it does not necessarily go hand-in-hand with complete control over the owned product. Intellectual property rules frequently require
authors and inventors to make their work publicly available in exchange for
legal protection.3 13 Many international and domestic patent laws, for
example, attempt to spur innovation by requiring the patent holder to
release sufficient information about her invention to allow others to copy
it. 3 14 Similarly, copyrights are usually only available for published
works. 3 15 Even if states did have rights to their article 76 submissions,
therefore, the Commission could still require them to make data public to
participate in the submission process. The policy reasons for doing sogreater accountability, enhanced respect for states' rights, and a more effective CLCS-are as meaningful to the continental shelf regime as increased
innovation and creativity are to the intellectual property system.
Ideally, the Commission should require states to give all UNCLOS parties unrestricted access to their submissions. As discussed, however, states
clearly are sensitive about the data they submit and eliminating confidentiality may be politically infeasible. 3 16 If so, the Commission must still
restrict it to only the most sensitive data. Determining exactly what this
would encompass requires experience with, and an in-depth understanding of, the evidence that states submit and, thus, is beyond the scope of this
Article. The CLCS, however, must engage in this inquiry as soon as possible and quickly produce amended confidentiality rules. In doing so, it
should encourage states to submit written comments on the types of data
they most want to protect, and it should consider these comments and
incorporate them into the rules, as appropriate. Along with the amended
rules, the Commission should produce a written report explaining its decision-making process and responding to states' comments; this will enhance
transparency and help guarantee that the Commission is responsive to
legitimate state concerns.
Having reduced confidentiality protections, the Commission should
require submitting states to release redacted versions of their submissions
313. See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 122(b)(1) (2007) ("[E]ach application for a patent shall be
published .. .promptly after the expiration of a period of 18 months from the earliest
filing date ....); see generallyJoel Reidenberg, The Rule of Intellectual Property Law in
the Internet Economy, 44 Hous. L. REv. 1073, 1076-77 (2007) (describing public function of intellectual property law as promoting creation and information dissemination).
314. See, e.g., TRIPS, supra note 312, art. 29 (requiring WTO Members to restrict
patents to those who disclose invention such that "a person skilled in the art" could
carry it out).
315. See, e.g., Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Work art.
2, Sept. 9, 1886, as last revised at Paris on July 24, 1971, 25 U.S.T. 1341, 828 U.N.T.S.
221 (limiting copyright protection to published works).
316. See supra Part II.B.
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to all UNCLOS parties, rather than just Executive Summaries. The Commission should require sub-commissions to consider all comments parties
provide on these submissions, not just those from states with possible
boundary disputes. Finally, when the sub-commission provides its preliminary recommendations to the submitting state for comments, it should
also release them-redacted if necessary-to all parties, permit them to submit comments, and consider these comments before the final drafting.
Final recommendations -with confidential information removed-also
should be made public. Reducing confidentiality will give all parties a
voice in review, help check excessive claims, and guarantee that the Commission takes into account the concerns of non-wide-margin states.
5.

Requiring Reasoned Explanations and Justificationsfor Decisions

Requiring the CLCS to produce detailed, reasoned, and public explanations of its decisions is perhaps the most direct way to track how it is
interpreting article 76 and carrying out its mandate. Publishing justifications subject to open scrutiny will encourage the Commission to be diligent and precise during reviews. A written record of deliberations will give
states a base from which to study the Commission's decisions and critique
them or push for changes if necessary. The Commission should prepare
the following three types of written explanations.
First, along with recommendations, submitting states should receive a
detailed report on the sub-commission's and Commission's deliberations.
The report can protect the anonymity of Commissioners by redacting their
names, but it should provide an in-depth explanation of how they dealt
with each aspect of the state's claim, including how they interpreted each
element of article 76. The report should also explain how the sub-commission dealt with comments the state submitted when it reviewed the recommendations. Second, the Commission should release a similar, though less
detailed, report to all parties that should include explanations of how the
Commission considered and incorporated any comments submitted when
the parties reviewed the draft recommendations. Similarly, the Commission should send a written explanation, in addition to a general report, to
each state that submitted an initial comment on the submission before the
Commission began the review, explaining how it incorporated the state's
position into the recommendations or why it did not do so.
Finally, every two years the Commission should produce a "lessons
learned" report that discusses the major problems it has run into during
review and how it has dealt with them, as well as whether and how its
understanding of article 76 has evolved. The Commission has already produced one such report for internal use. 3 17 Making this a regular requirement and releasing it to parties would encourage the Commission to reflect
317. See Comm'n on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, Statement by the Chairmanof
the Commission on the Limits of the ContinentalShelf on the Progress of Worh in the Commission, para. 8, U.N. Doc. CLCS/39 (Apr. 30, 2004) [hereinafter CLCS 13th Session
Report] (introducing document addressing lessons learned based on experience with
Russia's submission).
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more deeply on its work and its role in the continental shelf regime, as well
as increase public understanding of the review process.
6.

Increasing Interaction Between Commission and Parties on Other
Substantive Areas

The reforms proposed thus far mostly relate to the submission process. As discussed, however, the Commission also makes important procedural and substantive decisions about article 76 through the Guidelines
and Rules of Procedure.3 1 8 Accountability in these areas also must be
improved. The Commission already has put a great deal of time and effort
into writing the Guidelines and Rules and it would be counter-productive
to scrap them. Rather, the Commission should set up procedures to review
and update both documents regularly with input from states.
Given the lack of clarity around many of its terms and procedures,
interpreting and applying article 76 is a dynamic process-the Commission's understanding of what it means and how it works will undoubtedly
grow and shift through the development and review of claims. As the
Guidelines are the main tool for interpreting the article, they should be
3 19
treated as a living document that evolves along with that understanding.
In recognition of this, the Commission should hold an open conference
every two years to review and amend the Guidelines based upon states', as
well as its own, experiences. Such a conference would provide an opportunity for states and Commissioners openly to discuss interpretation difficulties and, hopefully, develop a common understanding of the article's
meaning. The Commission should run the conference and have final drafting authority, but should be required to take states' comments into account
when updating the document and produce a Conference report that summarizes debate and explains all changes.
As the Rules of Procedure are, in fact, mostly procedural, the Commission does not have a duty to amend them at the behest of states. 3 20 Nonetheless, greater responsiveness to states' concerns is important, as it is
likely to increase trust in the Commissioners and the process. As such, at
SPLOS each year, the Commission should conduct an open meeting with
states to discuss any procedural concerns. The Commission should discuss these concerns at its next meeting and amend the Rules, if necessary.
The Chair's annual report should provide a detailed explanation of this
debate and the Commission's final decisions.

318. See supra Part I.
319. See CLCS Guidelines, supra note 85, para. 1.1 (noting the Guidelines "form the
basis" of CLCS to prepare its recommendations).
320. Indeed, the Rules actually discourage Commissioners from becoming too
responsive to any entity outside the Commission. See Rules of Procedure,supra note 157,
r. 11 (stating that Commissioners must refrain from "seek[ing] or receiviing] instructions" from external actors).
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C. Potential Criticisms of the Proposed Reforms
The reforms just presented should greatly enhance the CLCS' accountability to the states that created it and whose rights its work affects.
Changing nominating and financing procedures should increase Commissioners' independence from the parties. Adding legal experts will help
guarantee that the Commission is not misinterpreting article 76's legal provisions or overstepping its mandate. Increasing participatory opportunities for submitting states and other parties will improve transparency, give
states a chance to check the Commission's work, and likely increase buy-in
and respect for its recommendations. Requiring the CLCS to provide written explanations of its decisions makes it easier to analyze how it is interpreting article 76; it should also make Commissioners more conscientious
and precise in their own analyses. Finally, giving states a role in the Guidelines and Rules of Procedure will ensure that there is accountability in all
of the CLCS' major substantive responsibilities, and improve trust in the
CLCS as an institution.
While the mechanisms proposed represent a fairly full reform agenda,
some may note that one seemingly important and obvious proposal is
missing: an independent panel to which states can appeal adverse CLCS
decisions. There are several reasons why this Article does not propose
independent review, at least for the time being. An independent appellate
body would greatly interfere with the ping-pong review process that
UNCLOS parties so carefully constructed. Though all of the reforms laid
out here increase accountability, none disrupt article 76's basic flowstates still submit proposals to the CLCS, the CLCS still reviews them and
issues recommendations, and the state still has the right to accept them or
resubmit. 3 2 1 Reforms simply guarantee that the slow narrowing-down of
the difference between states and CLCS understanding of the article is
informed, takes account of the interests of all parties, and respects states'
rights.
Giving states a chance to step outside of the existing review process
and demand external review, on the other hand, would create an adversarial process at odds with the existing intent of article 76.322 There is, of
course, no reason why the UNCLOS parties could not amend UNCLOS to
permit an appellate body. Doing so, however, could have significant drawbacks. Though this Article has emphasized article 76's legal nature, its
scientific and technical components are equally-if not more-important,
complex, and subject to competing interpretation. 3 23 Cooperation
321. See supra Part 1I.B (discussing article 76 review process).
322. See McDorman, supra note 101, at 306 (discussing importance of ping-pong
review procedure); Nelson, supra note 81, at 1250 (stating that Commission does not
have authority to submit recommendations to an outside legal body for review);
Zinchenko, supra note 124, at 225 (stating that Commission was never intended to be
court of law).
323. See generally Antunes & Pimentel, supra note 55 (discussing technical and legal
difficulties that arise when interpreting article 76); Macnab, supra note 35 (describing
problems arising from interpretation of article 76).
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between the submitting state and the Commission.is essential to applying
these aspects of the formula-the Commission must work with the state to
ensure that it has complete information, understands the data submitted,
and is aware of the techniques the state used to devise limits. 3 24 States

may be less willing to cooperate if they know they will have another opportunity to make their case if they disagree with the Commission's recommendations. Moreover, the iterative process of submission-resubmission
gives states and the Commission time to work through the article's significant complexities, which could be cut short prematurely by an outside
appeal. Finally, because of article 76's dual personality, existing international legal bodies, such as the ICJ and ITLOS, are probably not well suited
to review Commission decisions-the Commissioners may not be lawyers,
but neither are the judges scientists. An appellate body capable of thoroughly evaluating the Commission's decisions essentially would require
the creation of a second Commission. This would be difficult and costly,
and it is not clear why the second Commission's interpretation would take
precedence.
All of this is not to say, however, that an appellate body is absolutely
out of the question. Independent review is a key tool for creating accountability. Further, an article 76 appeals process would not necessarily require
another complete review of a state's submission. Along the lines of some
domestic administrative law regimes, states could be permitted to appeal
Commission decisions to the ICJ or ITLOS for a reasonableness reviewthe court would uphold the Commission's recommendations, provided it
32 5
sufficiently articulated a reasonable, well-founded rationale for them.
This Article does not endorse such a step because of the potential negative
impacts discussed above. If, however, the more subtle reforms proposed
here do not result in a sufficiently transparent and accountable CLCS, it
may be necessary to revisit the issue in the years to come.
One could also criticize the proposed reforms on another groundthey are modeled on Western notions of administrative law and thus are
either not applicable to the international arena or will be unacceptable to
non-Western countries. There are several responses to this argument.
First, while administrative law structures focused on transparency, reasongiving, participation, and review may have first arisen in places like the
Untied States and Europe, they are now also found in a wide variety of nonWestern countries, including those in the developing world. 3 26 Over the

past decade, government officials, academics, and other experts have real324. See McDorman, supra note 101, at 311 (noting Rules contemplated a "collaborative" working relationship between CLCS and states).
325. See generally Claudia Tobler, Note, The Standard of Judicial Review of Administrative Agencies in the U.S. and EU: Accountability and Reasonable Agency Action, 22 B.C.
INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 213 (1999) (discussing how reasonableness standard functions in
EU and U.S. administrative law).
326. The World Bank, Administrative and Civil Service Reform, http://web.worldbank.
org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTPUBLICSECTORANDGOVERNANCE/EXT
ADMINISTRATIVEANDCIVILSERVICEREFORM/,,contentMDK:20132482-menuPK: 18
28771-pagePK:148956-piPK:216618-theSitePK:286367,00.html (last visited Dec. 21,
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ized that strong institutions play a central role in promoting economic
growth, leading to a new interest in institutional development, including
well-functioning and transparent administrative agencies. 3 27 Reforms to
facilitate trade, investment, and the management of aid money have led
many countries to adopt regulatory procedures such as notice-and-comment and judicial review. 32 8 All of this suggests that familiarity and comfort with administrative-law reforms-and understanding of the need for
them-will be more wide-spread among UNCLOS parties than their Western roots might initially indicate.
Second, in terms of the international applicability of such reforms, a
variety of international organizations with diverse memberships have
adopted or at least discussed administrative-law-type reforms aimed at
enhancing accountability. 3 29 These reforms have not taken place in
response to the rise of global administrative law as an academic discipline
or at the behest of Europeans or Americans-government officials, citizen
groups, and organization representatives from many different countries

have developed, pushed for, and implemented changes. 330 Further, organizations that apply administrative law mechanisms specialize in a variety of
issues from financial regulation to environmental protection to develop-

2009) (documenting a huge variety of administrative law reforms taking place in devel-

oping countries).
327. Id.

328. See Kevin E. Davis & Michael J. Trebilcock, Legal Reforms and Development, 22
Q. 21, 30-32 (2001) (discussing how administrative law reforms in a
variety of countries have been successful in promoting development); Kingsbury et al.,
supra note 37, at 37 (discussing how reforms promoted by World Bank and InternaTHIRD WORLD

tional Monetary Fund have led many countries to adopt domestic administrative law
reforms or regulations); Richard A. Posner, Creating a Legal Framework for Economic
Development, 13 WORLD BANK REs. OBSERVER 1, 3-9 (1998) (discussing movement for
legal reform, including administrative law reform, to promote economic development);
see, e.g., United States-Korea Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-S. Korea, ch. XXI, arts.
21.1-21.4, June 30, 2007, pending Congressional approval, available at http://www.
ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/korus-fta/final-text (mandating noticeand-comment rulemaking and judicial review); North America Free Trade Agreement,
U.S.-Can.-Mex., Part VII, arts. 1802-05, Dec. 8, 1993, 32 L.L.M. 289 (requiring all
NAFTA parties to put in place notice-and-comment rulemaking and judicial review of
administrative decisions); The World Bank, supra note 326.
329. See Kingsbury et al., supra note 37, at 37-41 (describing measures implemented
in a wide variety of international institutions); see, e.g., David Zaring, Informal Procedure, Hard and Soft, in InternationalAdministration, 5 CHI. J. INT'L L. 547 (2005) (examining proceduralization in two international financial regulatory organizations).
330. See Joint Food and Agric. Org./World Health Org. Food Standards Programme,
Codex Alimentarius Comm'n, Report of the Fifty-First (Extraordinary)Session of the Executive Committee of the Codex Alimentarius Commission, paras. 24-25, ALINORM 03/25/2
(Feb. 11, 2003); Eyal Benvenisti, The Interplay Between Actors as a Determinant of the
Evolution of Administrative Law in International Institutions, 68 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS.
319, 323 (2005) (describing different actors who have pushed for administrative law
reforms); DEMANDING ACCOUNTABILITY: CIVIL-SOCIETY CLAIMS AND THE WORLD BANK
INSPECTION PANEL (Dana Clark et al. eds., 2003) (describing international advocacy campaign that led World Bank to adopt its Inspection Panel, which provides a complaint and
review process for individuals and communities affected by Bank projects).
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ment financing. 3 3 ' There is no reason, therefore, that similar concepts
could not be applied to the continental shelf.
The fact that accountability reforms are becoming more prevalent
internationally illuminates an important point-transparency, reasoned
decision-making, participation, and review can benefit many countries not
just those that have embraced them domestically. Many states have a great
deal at stake when it comes to shelf and deep-seabed limits. If the Commission is permitted to make decisions in a black box-without meaningful interaction with or participation from UNCLOS parties-then none of
these countries will be able to check its decisions. A secretive Commission
also does not necessarily mean a completely independent one. The CLCS
could well be subject to informal pressure from individual states that may
result in biased decision-making. In all likelihood, this pressure would
come from larger, more powerful countries, such as the United States and
members of the EU, who have the most political muscle at the UN.
Reforming the CLCS to increase its formal accountability to all UNCLOS
parties could help mitigate the power of bigger or wealthier countries to
unfairly influence the delineation process. Therefore, if the ideas provided
here can provide greater accountability, they ought to garner the support of
countries from many cultural and political traditions. In addition, there is
no reason that these reforms have to be the only ones the CLCS undertakes. This Article's most important contribution to the CLCS literature is
the idea that the Commission should be accountable to UNCLOS parties
and that its current procedures are full of accountability gaps. If academics, shelf experts, or government officials from other administrative-law
backgrounds can propose alternative or additional reforms that would also
improve the Commission's accountability, then they should not hesitate to
3 32
throw their ideas into the mix.

Conclusion
This Article presented a number of reforms to the CLCS that, if
adopted, could greatly enhance the institution's accountability to the
nations that created it. In doing so, it articulated several strong reasons
why such accountability is important. Through its work, the CLCS helps
to shape both the meaning of a treaty provision and the limits of states'
rights under it. Greater accountability to those states thus is normatively
appropriate and necessary to ensure that the Commission's interpretation
of article 76 is technically and legally sound. Further, if article 76 is going
to result in accurate boundaries that respect the rights of all UNCLOS par331. See GLOBAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: CASES, MATERIALS, ISSUES 67-76, 129-32
(Sabino Cassese et al. eds., Institute for International Law and Justice, 2d ed. 2008)
(discussing how administrative law mechanisms work in organizations that work in
each of these areas).
332. Richard Stewart, one of the originators of the discipline of global administrative
law, has also made this point. See Richard B. Stewart, U.S. Administrative Law: A Model
for Global Administrative Law?, 68 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 63, 65-66 (2005) (discussing international regulatory cooperation).
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ties, the CLCS must carry out its mandate properly and have the trust and
respect of both negotiating blocs. Giving states some ability to participate
in the Commission's most important work and enhancing transparency
throughout its procedures will help achieve both of these goals.
Of course, after proposing a reform agenda, the question always
becomes-is anyone actually going to do any of this? Significant political
will is necessary to achieve any of the reforms detailed here. UNCLOS
parties will need to adopt the small changes to article 76 proposed here
and pressure the Commission to rethink its procedures. The Commissioners, in turn, will need to come together formally to adopt the changes to the
submission process and other reforms. Though there is certainly no guarantee that any of this will happen, the Commission's escalating activity has
increased interest in how it functions, both among States Parties and
among the Commissioners themselves. States' demands for increased participatory rights only arose in the past three years, but the Commission has
already shown some willingness to respond to the concerns raised.
As more states begin submitting claims, it is likely that interest in and
discussion of the CLCS process will intensify. Within the Commission,
discussion is focused on how to maintain the integrity of the review process in the face of increasing submissions and demands on the Commissioners' time and resources. Though this does not necessarily pertain to
increased accountability, it does show that the Commission is interested in
reviewing and improving how it functions as it carries out its work. The
reasons for reform presented in this article-the impact of the CLCS on
states' rights and the need for it to be maximally effective in carrying out
its work-are of interest to both states and Commissioners. If the reforms
proposed here are framed around these arguments, then it may be possible
to harness rising interest and energy to push for meaningful change in the
CLCS. This would be a significant achievement, not only because it would
mark a victory for accountability in the international realm, but also
because it would avoid the need to revert to titanium flags, submarines,
and fifteenth century land grabs as the world goes about dividing up the
ocean floor.

